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The State of Montana holds quarterly auctions for the rights to drill for 
oil and gas on state land. During the decade that this study encompasses 
the revenue from these auctions has risen from just over sixty thousand 
dollars in first quarter 1971 to a high of over fifteen million dollars in 
second quarter 1980. If the stream of revenues is to be maximized over 
time, it becomes important to forecast the future revenue from these 
auctions, given assumptions about certain economic and physical trends.
Using a market approach to distribute leases has three functional 
characteristics; the generation of revenues, the allocation of a scarce 
resource, and the provision of information for future decision making. This 
last function makes it unnecessary for the state to do extensive geological 
evaluation to determine the value of tracts, provided a fa ir  auction process 
is used, awarding no leases in auctions with less than four bidders.
Several methods of regression analysis are used to analyze the data on 
successful lease bids. The announcement of large OPEC price hikes 
triggered increases in lease prices before the price hike actually occured. 
The effect of these influential observations is reduced using a linear 
regression technique that is not as responsive to outliers as ordinary least 
squares.
The equation developed include varibles for the price of oil, interest rates, 
state and national oil production and current oil field activity. This equation, 
given certain assumptions about the future, is then used to forecast 
revenue, and thus aid in long term planning.
One of the striking results of this analysis is that the government need 
not engage in gathering information about specific tracts. The only 
information that the government needs is of an economic nature, which is 
then used to plan the location and timing of future sales in a fashion 
designed to maximize the present value of the stream of revenues.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
The rapid increases in the price of oil over the last decade has lead to sig­
nificant changes in the world economy. The structure of the oil industry has also 
been changing radically over that time, as well as the patterns of national and in­
ternational trade and political power. These changes have been felt by consumers 
as well as producers of oil and related goods and services. The owner of the 
rights to petroleum or coal deposits has seen them grow in value three or four 
times. The implications of this to a state such as Montana are varied. The State of 
Montana owns a large number of tracts of land scattered across the state. 
Thousands of those acres are over potential oil producing deposits. Montana has 
seen the value of some oil leases increase greatly since the price of oil started to 
rise in 1972 and since the state leases out the rights to drill and extract oil on 
State lands, there needs to be some discussion both of the mechanism and the 
results of the process which allocates those leases.
Once every quarter the Montana Department of State Lands holds an auction 
to sell leases which confer both the right to explore for oil and gas, and extract it 
from land that belongs to the state. In general, the lessee is given the exclusive 
right to explore for, to drill for, to develop, to produce, and to remove and market 
his share of the production from a lease tract. In rare cases, exploratory leases 
are let, which restrict the lessee to just exploration. The attraction of these leases
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is that they tend to be considerably less expensive than full exploration and 
development leases. However, there is a risk that when the lessee goes to re­
negotiate for development and production rights, the lessor will demand an ex­
orbitant fee.
The State Lands auctions involve oral bids in which the bidding variable is a 
cash payment, or "bonus", which must be paid to the government before the 
lessee's rights may be exercised, i.e. before any exploration or development may 
begin. These leases extend for a period of ten years or as long as the tract is 
producing either oil or natural gas. Payments to the State include the original bid 
price or "bonus payment", a royalty of 13 percent on the value of the crude oil 
pumped per year, 12 1/2% on all gas produced, and an annual rental of $1.50 per 
acre. These leases often sell for the minimum bid, which in many cases is $1.50 
per acre.
The Department of State Lands is charged with administering the lands under 
its control in order to maximize "...the advantage to the state". For the purposes of 
this paper it will be assumed that this mandate includes the maximization of 
revenue from lands leased for oil and gas exploration and development. To max­
imize revenue can be taken as meaning the maximization of revenue across time, 
that is, the maximization of the present value of current and future sales from 
state lands. At a macro level, the more oil produced now, the less can be 
produced in the future. If the price of the particular resource is expected to 
remain constant or decline over time, the producer will prefer to sell the maximum 
amount in the earliest time period and thus be able to invest the proceeds else­
where. If the real price is expected to go up at the same rate as the interest rate, 
the producer will be indifferent to production now as compared to production in 
later time periods.
The decision to drill in a particular area is, in reality, a two part process. The 
first step is deciding to gather information on a particular tract or area, and the 
second is then deciding to drill in a particular location and applying to The Depart­
ment to make that tract available for leasing. For the sake of simplicity, both of 
these steps can be considered as one. The individual tracts are made available for 
lease by applying to the Department of State Lands. The Department then 
publishes a list of tracts to be sold at the next auction in The Montana Oil Journal. 
In this process, the state does not have any real control over the timing of oil and 
gas development on state lands.
As figure 1-1 shows, there has been considerable variation In the amount of 
land sold in each quarter over the study period 1971-1961J The quantity of land 
that is available for lease seems to be very responsive to the desire to drill. If this 
is true, then a change In the quantity of land demanded for leasing will result In a 
supply quantity response that will offset to a great degree, the price response that 
would normally occur. The Implication Is that supply may be a demand response. 
If this is the case, then any attempt to maximize long run returns (or net present 
benefit) Is bound to fall; because no amount of planning can influence the actual 
timing of the leases.
^This data is from The Montana Department of State lands which was kind enough to supply the  
Montana lease data for this study.
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There are three primary objectives to this paper: a brief exploration of the 
literature, an econometric analysis of current behavior, and a discussion of the 
policy implications and alternatives. In discussing the current behavior, I will not 
be attempting to model the process a bidder goes through when deciding to bid 
on a tract or how much to bid, but rather to identify major influences and use 
them to project the revenue to the state from the sale of leases. The major issue 
to be considered is how the state allocates the scarce resource of oil and gas 
leases. A closely related issue is the criteria to be used in making the choices of 
how resources are allocated.
Chapter 2 
The Petroleum Market
The demand for oil and gas leases is a derived demand, derived from the 
demand for crude oil, which in turn is derived from the demand for petroleum 
products. The major demands for petroleum are transportation; to produce 
gasoline, diesel, or aviation fuels, or as a feedstock for the petrochemical industry; 
used to produce fertilizers, pesticides, and plastics. Oil leases are purchased by 
both integrated oil companies as well as companies interested in marketing either 
crude oil, or producing wells. "Many companies have found It to be much cheaper 
to buy producing properties than to try to explore for and develop their own" [20,P. 
9].
It is important to examine the influence the market for crude oil has on the 
market for oil and gas leases within Montana. For this reason, the analysis of oil 
and gas leasing is concerned in part with the price of crude oil. The wellhead 
price of crude is an important determinant of the lease price, which is evidenced 
by a strong correlation between oil prices and lease prices.^ The wellhead price is 
affected by a number of factors: quality, costs of transportation and refining, and 
demand and supply conditions to name a few. There are two aspects of crude oil
correlation of 0.708 was calculated using the data from The Montana Departm ent of S tate Lands 
and the U.S. price for new oil over the study period 1971-1981.
quality which influence its price: the distillate content and the sulphur content. 
Light crude oils command higher prices than heavier crudes, both because of their 
higher distillate content and they invariably have a low sulphur content. The sul­
phur content is important for several reasons; the main ones are lower refining 
costs, due to the need for less desulfurization, as well as environmental con­
straints, which may restrict or even prohibit the use of high sulphur fuels. The 
wellhead price of crude also varies with the location of the well or collection ter­
minal reflecting transportation costs to major markets.
An other influence on the price of oil and gas leases is the cost of bringing 
the oil to market If we assume that exploration, development, and marketing of 
crude oil (within the United States) is a competitive industry,^ then it is safe to say 
that producers (within the United States) can not influence the price of crude that 
they sell to refineries, in 1976, the eight major oil companies had only an es­
timated 40 percent of the total U.S. domestic oil production, while the number of 
oil and gas operators in the petroleum industry numbered over 16,000 [20,P. 267]. 
Competition in the market for an exhaustible resource is characterized by a great 
number of producers. Each producer can independently decide how much of the 
resource he will "produce" during each time period. Because the average producer 
can have no impact on the price, they want to minimize the cost of producing and 
transporting it to market.
^Ramsey (1980) notes, "The conclusion from th(e) evidence was that the oil industry Is at least as 
competitive as United States manufacturing is on average" [35,P. 153] and "On the dem and side (of 
the lease market), one may usefully assume a com petitive market." and this, he goes on to say "...leads 
to the formulation of a stochastic demand curve . where the expected value of market dem and is the  
fam iliar quantity dem anded/price relationship" [35,P. 153] (Emphasis added).
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There are a number of forces which act on the cost of drilling an oil well, 
which is a factor in defining the oil lease market. The first is a change in the 
prices of goods and services purchased by the drilling company or operator. This 
affects all wells in proportion to the amount of those goods and services that are 
used in drilling them. The depth of a well influence its cost both directly and in­
directly. Directly, in that, more powerful drilling rigs, and stronger drilling pipe are 
required for deep wells; the deeper the well, the longer the time it takes to replace 
the drill bit and so forth. Indirectly, because there is no reason to suppose that 
changes in prices will affect different depth wells proportionally. Thus the effects 
of price increases may not be, and probably are not, depth neutral. In addition, the 
effects of technological change will act to reduce the per well cost, but again the 
effects may not be clear. The reduction in cost may not be proportional from one 
well to another. The cost of an exploratory well is a function of the drilling depth, 
the success ratio, the average size of discovery per successful wildcat, and the 
number of wildcats drilled. Because there is no real apriori knowledge of location, 
depth, or size when drilling an exploratory well, the firm uses geological data to 
try and approximate that information.
One of the greatest influences on per unit cost, once the well has been 
drilled, is its productivity. The large onshore wells in the Middle East are some of 
the most productive in the world. They may flow at a rate of 10,000 barrels per 
day or more, and produce oil at a cost of about 10 cents per barrel. More 
moderate wells in areas such as Nigeria may produce 2,000 barrels per day at a 
cost of around 50 cents per barrel. Small wells, such as those in most parts of
the United States have production quantities in the area of 20 to 100 barrels per 
day and may have to be pumped. The cost from these wells may be $1.00 per 
barrel. Production from more exotic wells, such as those on the North Slope or 
from typical offshore oil wells may also cost around $1.00 per barrel, and produc­
tion from such unfavorable areas as the North Sea may cost $5.00 per barrel or 
more [23,P. 501.
In that the oil and gas under state lands is a non-renewable resource, the 
sale of leases to drill for oil and gas is also a non-renewable resource. If the bid­
der either defaults on the bonus payment, or fails to drill within the required 
amount of time, the lease may be sold again. However, once the purchaser (or his 
agent) has drilled, either successfully or unsuccessfully, that particular tract is no 
longer available to the State for resale. If the State was better able to make 
projections about future revenues, it would then be able to allocate the sale of 
tracts across time, additionally it might set a minimum price that better reflected 
the "cost" of selling a tract in the present as compared to selling it sometime in 
the future. Another option is to in someway alter the bidding process so that 
Montana captures a larger portion of the profits associated with oil production on 
state lands.
Chapter 3 
The Theory of Auctions
There are three main roles for a market approach, i.e. the use of an auction 
process, in the distribution of oil and gas leases. They are the generation of 
revenues for the seller, the allocation of a scarce resource, and the provision of 
information for future decisionmaking. In most cases, this last role is considered 
the most important. The oil and gas industry is inherently an uncertain one. The 
auction process, when correctly functioning, generates relative prices for different 
areas, which reduce to some extent the uncertainty about their relative values. 
The government learns which areas should be given priority in future leasing and 
bidders learn from their success or failure how they should bid in the future. It is 
a process that reduces uncertainty over time by generating a stream of prices that 
are available to everyone.
It should be noted that oil and gas lease tracts are an example of either 
single items or multiple offerings of heterogeneous items. This is because, with 
some exceptions, tracts are neither homogeneous in size nor quality. In this con­
text, the word quality generally refers to the likelihood of discovering oil or gas of 
a quantity and at a depth that would make the development of that tract profitable.
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3.1. Bidding
When examining the auction process, it is useful to consider the differences 
between the two major bidding methods used. In much of the literature, the dis­
tinction among bidding procedures is between oral and sealed bids. This is a dis­
tinction by method, but not by effects, and as such is not very useful theoretically. 
A more valuable way to examine bidding procedures is to categorize them as ei­
ther "competitive" ("standard", or "non-discriminatory"), or "discriminatory".
With competitive bidding, the highest bid wins "...but pays an amount equal 
to the second highest bid" [35,p. 66] and with discriminatory bidding the highest 
bidder also wins, but the winner pays the amount of his winning bid. Usually, 
sealed bidding is done is a discriminatory manner; and oral bidding, in the United 
States and Great Britain, is done in a competitive manner However, it is possible 
for sealed bids to be carried out is a competitive manner and for oral auctions to 
be discriminatory.
It is important to consider the effects that the different bidding methods can 
have on the outcome of an auction. Vernon Smith (1967) has shown, for the 
simple models he examined, assuming each bidder maximizes the expected utility 
of the outcome of his actions, "...the effective demand curve under the dis­
criminatory auction bidding procedure lay everywhere below the market demand 
curve..." [35,p. 67]. W. Vickery (1961), assuming profit maximizing behavior and a 
certain distribution of the value to each bidder of the item being auctioned, con­
cluded that the expected price to the seller was the same under both methods.
From these and other studies, it has become clear that as the number of
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bidders increases the maximum bid price also increases. However, with a se­
quence of auctions, this result changes somewhat as the bidders learn from pre­
vious auctions. Winning bidders learn that in a discriminatory auction they can 
continue to win with lower bids and losers learn to raise their bids. However, 
"...changes in the amount supplied from period to period, or changes in the quality 
or nature of the object of bidding slow the learning process" [35,p. 68]. Smith 
(1967) found in repeated experiments where market demand and supply conditions 
were unknown to the bidders, bidding converged quickly to the experimentally 
determined market price, even though each bidder knew only his own cir­
cumstances and the current bid/offer amount. Wilson (1977) has shown that the 
maximum bid converges almost surely to the value of the item being auctioned. 
However, bidders were still assumed to be risk neutral and the bidding process 
discriminatory.
3.2. Rent
Low cost oil producing areas extract "rent" as the price of oil increases. 
"Economic rent is defined as the amount by which the price of a good or service 
could be reduced without motivating its owner to alter the use and employment of 
the resource" (5,p. 560]. This use of the word "rent" should not be confused with 
that normally associated with the price of using an apartment or car owned by 
someone else. Changes in the economy which in some manner either increase the 
demand for oil, or interrupt supply may lead to price increases that generate "rent" 
to the owners of the leases (wells). Rent can be thought of as the difference be­
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tween the value received by producers (reflecting the consumers willingness to 
pay) and the transfer price,^ alternatively, "economic rent can be defined as the 
difference between market price and opportunity cost" [5,p. 563]. Opportunity cost 
is the value of the resource in its next most profitable use. Payments above the 
opportunity cost (transfer price ) are unnecessary for allocating the resource to a 
particular use.
Rent in the economic sense must also be distinguished from "quasi-rent". 
"The payment to any input in temporarily short supply is called a quasi-rent" [26,p. 
370]. In the short-run it may seem that a company is making excess profit (or 
rent) on the production from a particularly rich field, but the company in all prob­
ability has drilled a number of "dry holes" in its search for oil. Normal profit must 
be large enough to cover the expenses of these dry holes as well as induce the 
company (or industry) to continue exploration. These short run surplus' which ap­
pears to be excessive profit or "rent" may be only normal profit or "quasi-rent" 
when viewed in the long-run. Real rent therefore is those same excess profits, 
when they continue into the long-run. For example, in fields which were drilled 
when the price of a barrel of oil was around two dollars per barrel, in the absence 
of regulation, there is enormous rent accruing to the owners of those wells now 
that oil sells for around thirty dollars per barrel.
Economic rent is an attractive target for taxation because the tax burden, 
"cannot be shifted onto others and consequently produces no distortions or excess
*The transfer price is considered the price at which a producer is indifferent to allocating resources  
to one use or the next best alternative.
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burden" [5,p. 563]. The oil severance tax and windfall profits taxes on oil 
producers are several ways society has for capturing some portion of the rent as­
sociated with the sudden upswing in the price of oil in the last decade.
3.3. Risk
The quality of a lease tract can be considered as a combination of the 
likelihood that there is any oil at all to be found in a particular tract, the quantity 
of oil to be found, the quality of that oil (BTU and sulfur content), and the depth of 
the oil. All these factors influence the risk of drilling a productive well. The 
higher the risk, the lower the potential future profits from a particular lease tract, 
and the lower the winning bid is apt to be. Ramsey has concluded that "an in­
crease in risk for a given assumed value of the lease will lower the optimal bid 
price under both discriminatory and competitive bidding methods" [35,p. 81].
One of the levels of distinction which is often made in the theory, which is 
now practically irrelevant in real world analysis, is between risk, where the 
probablities of random occurences are assumed to be known, and uncertainty, 
where those probabilities are assumed to be unknown. In reality, the probabilities 
of random occurences are very seldom known, except for games, such as poker or 
roulette. The decision maker, usually, has some idea of the probability function 
and uses that uncertain information, along with any other data, to estimate the 
parameters of the probability distribution and thus derive estimates of the 
probabilities. This differs from the classical risk situation in that the decision 
maker can learn and thus acquire additional information about the problem or
15
process. No decision making is carried out in pure uncertainty, since the only 
recommendation that could be made is that all unknown events are equally likely. 
Not a very useful form of analysis. A further complication is that the underlying 
probability functions often change from one situation to another, and sometimes 
from one time period to the next, thus making the learning process more difficult.
Each random process is composed of two components, the stochastic com­
ponent (or variation) and the deterministic component. The stochastic component 
may be thought of as the effect produced by factors outside the bidder's control, 
and the deterministic competent as the direct result of the bidder's actions and 
decisions. In oil well drilling, the variation in the stochastic component is much 
larger relative to the deterministic component.
Compare the oil exploration process to the manufacture of high quality 
watches, where the stochastic variation is (presumably) quite small when com­
pared to the deterministic component. It is this deterministic component that 
manufacturers are trying to contain with product inspections and quality control. 
There is no effective way for the entrepreneur to control for the stochastic varia­
tion that makes oil and gas drilling such a risky business.
There are two main sources of risk facing potential bidders for oil and gas 
leases, inherent causes and ignorance. Inherent causes of risk are derived from 
the physical or economic environment the economic agent (bidder) is operating in. 
Prices change due to unexplainable shifts in demand, machines that break down 
randomly and men who fail to show up at work are all examples of inherent risk. 
Both social and physical activities can be thought of as inherently random
16
processes.
The second main source of risk is ignorance. Ignorance in this context 
means lack of knowledge on the part of the decision maker. For example, the fu­
ture price of oil can play an important part in deciding on the price to pay for oil 
leases. One can be uncertain of the future price of oil, because prices are 
stochastic, but one can be equally uncertain even if prices are not stochastic. If 
the OPEC oil ministers are meeting to set the marker price of crude, the bidder is 
then uncertain about the future price, because he does not know what they will 
decide. If the uncertainly is due to ignorance, the bidder may be able to eliminate 
or at least reduce the the risk by obtaining new or better information. The uncer­
tainty of future demand will affect the price of leases as oil firms attempt to main­
tain an inventory of exploration prospects. Demand in the future may be larger or 
smaller than it is presently and it has a variance that increases as the time horizon 
does. However, uncertainty will not directly affect the price of a lease. Pindyck 
notes that "...demand uncertainty has no effects on the expected behavior of 
price" [33,p. 124].
In most real world situations, both of these types of risk occur to some ex­
tent. Most commonly the "...situation is one in which an economic agent must 
make a decision where the outcome depends on the value of a random variable 
and the parameters of that variable's distribution are not known" [19,p. 12].
A decision maker can make investments in three broad risk categories: (1) 
investments with very little risk about the expected return; (2) investments with a 
moderate degree of risk, but with neither the expectation of a large loss or a large
17
gain; and (3) those investments with a great deal of risk and the possibility of 
large losses or large gains. Generally, decision makers can be grouped into either 
the first category or the third. "[P]eople must in general be paid a premium to in­
duce them to undertake moderate risks Instead of subjecting themselves to either 
small or large risks" [18,p. 284]. We can consider the first group to be risk averse 
decision makers, and the second to be risk-takers. "The majority of firms in the 
[oil] industry exhibit significant aversion to risk, but the degree of risk aversion 
decreases among larger firms '. [39,p. 267]
In the discussion of risk, it must be remembered that the level of response 
to risk are not the same as the level of risk itself. This becomes clearer when you 
consider that a risk adverse person has a much stronger negative response to the 
same level of risk, than someone who is either risk neutral or a risk taker.
For risk adverse decision makers, the presence of risk in a project imposes a 
certain cost. Risk can be viewed as a cost in that the decision maker could ach­
ieve a higher level of utility if there was no risk in the situation. Thus, the deci­
sion maker faces a choice among several alternatives: bearing the full risk himself, 
engaging in market transactions to exchange the risk for some commodity, or en­
gaging in various activities to try to reduce the risk. The sale of stocks is a well 
documented form of risk transfer within the marketplace. The greater the amount 
of equity stock owned outside the firm, the greater the amount of risk the firm has 
distributed. Examples of the market transfer of risk are joint ventures, hedging, fu­
tures trading and of course insurance. There are two fundamental approaches for 
dealing with risk: benefit maximization, that is maximizing the benefits if everything
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goes right, or loss minimization, minimizing the losses if everything goes wrong.
If on average investors are risk averse, "properly functioning markets should 
confer higher profits on higher-risk firms and industries." [2,p. 304] This may ex­
plain the number of bids from small firms which are traditionally considered more 
risk averse, than larger firms. "[T]he premium required to induce a firms to accept 
such risks is inversely related to the size of the firm." [39,p. 252] One of the ways 
for firms to reduce the risk of investments is with a diversified portfolio, either by 
bidding on a number of small projects, or by the use of joint bidding, which 
spreads the potential losses over a consortium of firms.
If the risk is inherent in the physical situation, the decision maker may be 
able to alter the situation in such a fashion as to decrease the risk. The use of 
mine supports to prevent cave-ins and the use of quality control in manufacturing 
to reduce defects and the consequent product returns are both examples of reduc­
ing risk by changing the physical source of the risk. Insurance companies recog­
nize this and often insist on changes in plant design or operation as a condition 
for coverage. If the source of the uncertainty is ignorance, then the acquisition of 
information can reduce that risk, as in the use of geological data to determine 
locations for wildcat drilling.
It is this last response to risk which explains the use of an auction instead of 
setting the price of a drilling lease on a particular tract. The question of why the 
owner of a resource will sell it at auction and not by setting a price. Is answered 
in one word, ignorance. In this situation, the owner does not know the market 
price of the "item" up for sale and the cost of acquiring that information may be
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quite large. The use of the auction is a method by which the seller reduces his 
risk. There are essentially three alternatives to the seller who does not know the 
relevant demand curve he faces: he can acquire costly information about demand, 
he can set a price and bear the "waiting cost" until the good is sold, he can set a 
quantity and bear the cost of an uncertain price. There are substantial costs in 
determining the market value of an oil/gas tract, and while it is also true that there 
are costs of carrying out an auction, these costs probably will in no way approach 
those of acquiring the necessary market information to sell an oil and gas lease.
The distinction between an auction and just setting a price is that in the 
former the seller sets the quantity to be sold and is uncertain about the price at 
which the market will clear, and in the latter the seller sets the price and is uncer­
tain about the quantity at which the market will clear. If there were was no uncer­
tainty about the demand function, then the seller could choose to either quote a 
price and sell the desired quantity, or offer a quantity and accept those price offers 
at known demand prices. In either case, the result would be the same.
It is for these reasons that the auction process is superior to setting fixed 
prices, when the market price of a commodity is unknown, and an auction is a 
less costly way of reducing risk due to ignorance than acquiring information or 
waiting time costs, economic theory suggests that it should be used.
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3.4. The Auction Market
While these lease auctions often involve a "large" number of people, from 
which some might infer a competitive process, oral bidding tends to understate 
the maximum value that bidders are willing to pay. Many similar auctions now 
take the form of sealed bid auctions. In this situation, there is no (or certainly 
much less) possibility of interaction among the bidders. "[Tjheory predicts that 
collusive conduct is more likely to occur when... the number of firms in an industry 
is small". [17,p. 211. This is because as the industry becomes larger it is both har­
der to coordinate the actions of the firms and because cost and demand con­
ditions will vary among the firms which tends to reduce the incentive for collusion. 
A sealed bid auction would reduce the possiblity of collusion since the ability to 
explicitly collude beforehand would be significantly reduced by the sheer numbers 
involved. If a bidder wants to drill on a particular tract, there is no effective way 
for him to find out what the other potential participants are willing to pay for that 
tract. In this case, the only effective strategy is to bid the maximum amount the 
lease is worth, taking into account the risk of a dry hole, the anticipated costs of 
the project, and the potential for changes in the price of oil over the lifetime of 
the project.
The number of bidders also plays an important part in the results of the auc­
tion using either the discriminatory or competitive bidding scheme. Given the as­
sumptions that each bidder has market information about the conditions that he 
faces, but no information about specific competitors, and that the bidder does not 
know how many competitors he has, Ramsey concludes "...the maximum
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expected...bid increases with...the number of bidders, despite the fact that each in­
dividual bidder lowers his optimal bid" [35,p. 94]. He also assumes that there is a 
single seller of a single good, (e.g. the State of Montana selling oil leases), that 
each bidder has the same access to information and that bidder react to the ag­
gregate behavior of their competitors, not to individual ones.
Probably the most important question to be asked in this section is which of 
the two bidding procedures, discriminatory or competitive, yields the largest ex­
pected return to the producer. The answer is not a simple one since the results 
are affected by the number of bidders, their risk aversion, and their wealth. In 
general, one can say that discriminatory bidding will yield the greater return for 
small numbers of low risk averse, large-wealth bidders, and the competitive bid­
ding procedure will yield the greater return for large numbers of low wealth, highly 
risk averse bidders. When we speak of "small numbers" of bidders, ten is generally 
considered the cutoff point [35,p. 96]. This is a number that is generally exceeded 
is Montana auctions. As to the question of whether the bidders are risk adverse 
or not and whether they are wealthly requires additional research.
3.5. The Long Term
There are three elements of the marginal, or incremental cost of oil left in 
the ground. They are the expected revenue, the discount rate, and the period of 
discount. The discount rate and the period of discount are tied together, because 
at any given discount rate there is a time period, beyond which any reasonable 
sum is discounted to a very small number or for the sake of analysis effectively to
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zero. The lower the discount rate, the more activity is moved into the future. If 
one assumes an interest rate and price structure of future increases such that a 
barrel of crude oil ten years from now is worth (in discounted dollars) the same as
a barrel of current production (ceteris paribus), the decision to produce now or ten
years hence is not a question that economics is capable of answering. It goes
from being a question of efficiency to one of allocation. It does not seem
legitimate to consider the opportunity cost of capital as the social discount rate 
(or social time preference), when "licensing" the production of an exhaustible 
resource. They are the same only under conditions of perfect capital markets, and 
a common perception of the future. That is, should that oil be used now, or 
should it be "allocated" to the future. A question that is beyond the scope of this 
paper.
Given the long-term nature of oil and gas development, the bidder has an 
enormous incentive to forecast the price of energy as accurately as possible. If 
future energy prices are overestimated, the firm will invest too much and realize a 
lower rate of return than if it had invested elsewhere. If, on the other hand, future 
energy prices are underestimated the firm will invest too little and end up forego­
ing profits. It is equally true that the state has the same incentive. The more ac­
curate the state's forecast, the greater the likelihood that the leases can be 
properly allocated across time, and thus maximize present net value.
According to the theory, the price of oil leases Is a function of a large num­
ber of economic variables, and therefore does not vary perfectly with the price of 
crude oil. Interest rates for investment capital, the amount of low cost crude be­
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ing imported, the number of rotary rigs available for drilling, changes in U.S. oil 
production, and probably most important the location of the lease, all affect its 
selling price. If the price of crude rises and the new price is expected to persist, 
what happens? The number of wildcats drilled will be higher than if the old price 
had been maintained, and areas that were considered attractive under the old price 
will be come even more attractive, and areas that were only marginally attractive 
under the old price will now be considered worth drilling. These areas are mar­
ginal because of the perception that they are poorer prospects. If this perception 
is approximately correct, it follows in aggregate, that either the success rate will 
be lower, the drilling depth deeper, or the average find smaller. All of these are 
elements of total cost, and any one of these will serve to raise the average cost 
per barrel found, thus behaving in an offsetting manner. While the price is up, 
there is a strong incentive to drill poorer prospects, but the higher per barrel cost 
of these prospects acts in the opposite direction. It is also true that if the price of 
oil falls instead of rises, the reverse will occur as marginal tracts are cut from the 
list of drilling prospects.
3.6. Bidding Alternatives
In the leasing of state lands, the goal of government can be defined as the 
maximization of net present benefit from the bonus payments, and the royalty pay­
ments. This requires that the planning horizon be long enough for all present oil 
reserves to be utilized. It is, however, impossible to make realistic long-run 
projections of supply and demand conditions. Additionally, the consequences of an
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extended time period and the discount rate diminishes the effect of these distant 
changes to insignificance. The present value of net oil revenue from the sale of 
oil and gas during the relevant time period is given by:
T
PNV- I  1/(1+r)'*(P,-C,)0, 
t=1
where T is the planning horizon, P -̂C  ̂ is the net revenue per barrel in year t, 
and r is the discount rate and is the production in year t. The interest rate is 
an important factor in the calculation of present new value. The higher the inter­
est rate (or discount rate) the lower present net value is. The use of a simple dis­
count approach to calculate net present value, or the internal rate of return can be 
used as a policy tool to determine the best timing of the sale of leases on State 
lands, given a particular view of the future.
From a broader, i.e. national, perspective, things do not have quite the same 
appearance. In 1980, imports of petroleum constituted over 40 percent of U.S. 
supply, and at then current price levels, it meant that we were spending over $90 
billion annually for oil [35,p. xvi]. The amount of dollars that were being exported 
every week had a profound effect on the American economy. There are a number 
of possible remedies; encourage conservation, develop alternative energy sources 
and/or increase domestic production of oil and gas. This last policy option may 
conflict with the desires of the various states to draw out the production of oil 
and gas over time, in order to better utilize the resource.
Once the timing of the oil and gas development on state lands is determined, 
there are a number of bidding variables that can be used to allocate the oil and 
gas leases. They can be used as alternatives to one another or in combination.
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TABLE 3-1:
COMPETITVE LEASE BIDDING MODELS AND OBJECT OF BIDDING 
011 and Gas leases. Federal and Active State Governments
Bidding Method 
Oral Auction Sealed Bid
Object of Bidding 
Bonus Royalty Rent
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
BLM
STATE GOVERNMENT
Alabama
Arkana
California
Colorado
Florida
Illin o is
Kansas
Lou1 Sana
Montana
Nebraska
New Mexico
North Dakota
Oklahoma
Pennsylvania
Exploratory lease 
Development lease 
Texas 
University Lands 
General land office  
Utah
X
X(l)
X
X(l)
NOTES:
(l)Colorado accepts sealed bid offers of ten dollars per acres bonus or more 
I f  less than this amount Is received by sealed bids, or none at a l l ,  the 
tract is offered In oral auction.
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The problem of introducing more than one into the negotiations and/or auction is 
that the State has then to decide at what rate to trade one item for another For 
example, if one bid is the highest for the bonus payment but not for royalties, and 
another is the highest for royalties but not for the bonus payment, who wins the 
bid? The State would have to develop a scheme to weigh the various items in a 
bid in order to determine the winning bid. However, if the weights are revealed 
the winner is the one with the comparative advantage in those areas most heavily 
weighted, if the weights are not revealed, the uncertainty of winning the bid, al­
ready implicit within the auction, will be increased, and such an increase may 
lower the amounts bid in the auction. The most common bidding variables are 
bonus payments, rent, royalty payments, exploration expenditures, "service" leases, 
and percentage rate of net return. Table 3-1 shows the bidding alternatives used 
by various governmental bodies in the U.S.
A bonus payment is a sum of money paid by the bidder to purchase the 
lease. With bonus payments the purchaser bears all the risk of the activity and the 
seller none.
In a royalty bid auction, the buyer bids on the amount to be paid on produc­
tion. The units bid in may be payments per physical unit produced or it may be an 
ad valorem arrangement, i.e. a percentage of the value of production. As the price 
of oil has risen, the tendency is toward the ad valorem approach For example, the 
traditional royalty in the Middle East before World War II was 4 shillings per ton. 
In 1971, the royalty was calculated at 15 percent of the posted price per barrel 
[40,p. 51]. There may also be a sliding scale used to calculate the amount of the
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royalty. In this instance, the percentage varies with output. This was the type of 
system that Montana had until March of 1983. Royalty percentages were not a 
bidding variable, but rather were fixed at 12 1/2 percent for the first 3,000 barrels 
produced per year, 17 1/2 percent for the next 3,000 barrels per year, and 25 per­
cent for any production over 6,000 barrels per year. If the ad valorem approach is 
used, the seller of the lease bears some risk due to the potential for changes in 
future oil prices.
A combination of bonus and royalties enables the seller to bear a portion of 
the upside risk that the buyer would be bearing in a bonus bid only situation. The 
seller has no risk of receiving less than the bonus payment, but is trading a higher 
bonus payment for the prospect of sharing in the returns of a successful dis­
covery.
Percentage profit bids are bids on the percentage of net annual return to be 
paid to the seller. While, this procedure lowers the cost on entry and encourages 
high risk leases, it generally involves higher "upside" risk for the seller than other 
methods. This procedure is different from the royalty procedure in that it is based 
on net return, i.e. after costs are subtracted from gross return. In fact, one of the 
drawbacks of this methods is defining costs, in particular, whether market return 
on equity capital should be treated as a cost. There has been some discussion in 
the literature that a major drawback of this method is that there is less incentive 
for the firms to minimize its costs of operation [25,p. 789]. Ramsey, however, has 
proven that this is not the case in a competitive environment. "The incentive to 
minimize cost and improve efficiency will be neither greater than nor less than for
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any other firm earing a competitive rate of return" [25,p. 127]. It should be noted 
that using percentage profit as a bidding variable is rare.
Another item that may be bid on is rent, the rate to be paid for holding the 
lease per unit of time. Rent has come to mean an advance payment for the 
privilege of postponing the drilling of wells on the leased tracts, and should not be 
confused with payments covering the use of the surface area of the land or with 
the concept of economic rent that was discussed earlier. The rental payments act 
as an incentive to the lessee to either start drilling as soon as possible or sur­
render the lease. Some of the risk is transferred to the seller in that there is a 
real possibility that the lease will remain undrilled and be subsequently returned to 
the seller. If a tract has been returned, bidders will most likely view it as more 
risky, since the perception is that any lease that has been surrendered is unlikely 
to be profitable.
Another procedure, one that is popular with the governments of Great Britain 
and Norway is the shared interest system. If the firm finds a commercially 
profitable amount of oil/gas, then the government is assigned a share in the ven­
ture both in costs and profits. In this scheme the seller bears some of the 
"upside" risk, with regard to the quality, quantity, and future price of oil found, but 
bears no "downside" risk if none is found. This is clearly an arrangement that only 
a national government could negotiate.
The effects of different bidding variables on present net worth are highly de­
pendent on the timing of payments. In general, it can be said that the later the 
payment to the state, the less will be the influence on the bidders present net
29
value. Conversely, the earlier the payment, the better it is from the State's point 
of view. The following observations can be made about the effects of differing 
payments on the present value calculations.
1. An initial bonus payment is a highly negative weight on the present net 
value of the bidder. If this payment must be made immediately, then it 
is accounted for at full value, because there is no discounting in the 
current time period. The later the bonus can be paid, the better off is 
the bidder and worse off is the State.
2. Annual rent payments have less of an impact that the bonus payment 
does, and its impact diminishes over time, due to the discounting 
process.
3. Royalties differ from both bonus payments and fixed rent payments in 
that bonuses and rents have to be paid from the time the lease is 
granted, but royalties are not paid until production starts. On the other 
hand, production in a lot of areas is much higher in the first few years 
and more royalties must then be paid. If the royalty is calculated on a 
sliding scale, then there is virtually no influence on small scale produc­
tion but there may a substantial influence on large scale production, 
the degree of which will depend on the negotiated arrangement.
The possible methods for maximizing the state's percentage of the "rent" (in 
the economic sense) are bonus payments, surface rent, royalties, and taxes. Each 
has differing effects as mentioned above.
The average influence of the bonus on the present net value to the bidder
has already be mentioned. The effect of this to reduce the amount of marginal
land that will be drilled. The imposition of large bonus payments is not an ef­
ficient method for maximizing public revenue.
Similarly, high surface rents cut into marginal fields, while profitable fields do
not contribute proportionally to public revenue. This is also viewed as an in­
efficient method for maximizing public revenue.
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Another possiblity is the corporate income tax. its effects depend on the use 
of the depletion allowance. The depletion allowance is in effect "a subsidy, ad­
ministered through the corporate income tax, for the benefit of petroieum 
producers" [40,p. 123]. The inclusion of the depletion allowance makes the cor­
porate income tax a less than perfect method for maximizing public revenue, be­
cause a large part of the rent is "returned" in the form of the depletion allowance. 
The corporate tax without the depletion allowance is "...a good medium for 
generating government proceeds as long as the tax rate is not excessively high" 
[40,p. 123]. If the tax rate is too high, the amount of reserves that can be 
economically recovered, will fall rapidly.
The fixed rate royalty, i.e. the royalty expressed as a fixed percentage of the 
unit price of oil, will have less impact on the economically recoverable reserves 
than any of the before mentioned options. However, it will still have some impact 
on the amount of economically recoverable reserves, and the higher the royalty 
percentage, the greater the impact will be. Sliding scale royalties can be used to 
mitigate a large portion of that impact. Highly productive fields would pay greater 
royalty percentages, and less productive fields would pay lower or no royalties at 
all. The state would still not be receiving the maximum public revenue, but the 
sliding scale would achieve this better than the fixed rate royalty.
It can be seen from this discussion that to maximize public revenue from 
state lands, the greatest weight should be placed on the use of the corporate in­
come tax (without the depletion allowance) and sliding scale royalties. This is not 
to say that surface rents and bonus payments should be done away with. They
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reduce the risk of zero Income, and provide an Incentive to the purchasers to drill 
as soon as possible. This becomes increasingly important if the state is to time 
the development of land that it owns.
The timing of the release of tracts of land for auction and subsequent ex­
ploration and development is of great importance to the state. As it now stands, if 
there is an increase in the price of oil likely within the next few years, the state 
does not have the ability to defer the leasing of tracts, until the time when they 
will bring a higher price, and thus more revenue to the state. In fact, the whole 
concept of discounting and present net value computations for determining the 
optimum release of tracts over time is worthless if bidders can apply for and bid 
on tracts of their choice. One of the most important changes the State should un­
dertake is to develop a long term plan to control the release of land for oil and 
gas development.
3.7. Lease Tract Information
The process of bidding at auction is a device to reduce the amount of infor­
mation the lessor has to have about the property to be leased. In fact, in simple 
cases, the only information the lessor needs to know is that the market demand 
(bidding) is competitive, and that the tracts are in fact available for leasing.
From the buyer's point of view, there is fairly common agreement about what 
information is relevant for the bidding process. There is an active market in such 
information, and in addition to this geological and geophysical information there is 
other information that each firm wishes to acquire about potential lease tracts.
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This information is specific to the firm, and includes not only data that the firm 
consider relevant and, consequentially, specializes in, but also the interpretation of 
that data reflecting the firms wealth (net worth), geographic concentration, and risk 
aversion. There are many firms which specialize in the gathering and processing 
of geophysical information, but are not the business of developing leases them­
selves.
It was noted earlier that a reduction in the risk of a project will increase the 
expected bonus payment received by the seller. So it can be concluded that 
"...under competitive conditions, the seller, not the buyers, gains from an increase 
in information...provided it is available to all parties" [35,p. 141]. Thus, from the 
lessors' point of view the value of additional information which is available to all 
potential participants in the auction is the amount of the increase in the expected 
value of the bonus payments received.
On the other hand, the information produced by or in the hands of a in­
dividual firm is of value only if it is not in the hands of other firms that are com­
peting for a particular tract. The value of that information is the difference be­
tween the bonus payment that would have been made had everyone had the same 
information, and the payment the firm actually makes. This scenario is compli­
cated when bidder A has information not available to others, but they know that A 
has the information, and further know that A knows that they know. This kind of 
theoretical asymmetrical information problem is often analyzed using game theory, 
simulations or other techniques.
These situations are interesting to consider, but often the assumptions are
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so restrictive or the analysis is not carried far enough to provide real world 
answers to questions that arise during a discussion of bidding strategies and the 
effects of different auction processes.
Some lessors (or their agents) worry about the lack of information they have 
on the value of the leases (or tracts) to be auctioned. In reality, it is more impor­
tant that the lessors know that the bidders are not acting collusively, and to know 
the optimal pattern of leasing, both geographically and over time. Other lessors 
worry about the effect of large bids for lease tracts. Saying in effect, that if firms 
must pay enormous amounts for leases, they will not be able to afford the costs 
of exploration and development, or that large bids will force out the smaller firms 
and thus reduce competition in the industry. While at first this may appear to be 
sound, in fact bonus bids are large because the firms expect to earn large returns 
from the lease accounting for the costs of exploration and development. If the 
bids do become large, small firms can participate In joint ventures with other firms 
large or small.
Despite the previous discussion, one might consider that the owner of a 
scarce non-renewable resource, like a series of oil bearing lands, needs some in­
formation in order to answer the two key questions that face any non-renewable 
resource owner; what is the optimal rate of offering, and what is the optimal 
geographical distribution of the offering to be?
The details of this decision-making process will not be taken up here, but 
that information which is necessary for those decisions should be mentioned 
briefly. As has been discussed earlier, detailed geological and geophysical data is
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of great use to the firms, but even if such information were available at no cost to 
the lessor, the "...benefit to him would be quite small" [35,p. 148]. The bidder is 
the one that needs that detailed information. All the lease owner needs to know is 
what subjective evaluation those bidders are placing on the lease area, and this in­
formation is most efficiently learned through the bidding process. The information 
which the owner needs then is economic in nature, that information which will en­
able him to forecast the expected price for leases.
If the average number of bidders per bidding tract is "too small", then the 
number of tracts being let is probably too large. If the number of bidders per of­
fered tract is very "large", then the number of tracts being let is probably too 
small. Ramsey defines "too small" as fewer than three or four bidders on a lease 
tract. "If the number is in excess of fifteen to twenty per lease, the rate (of 
offering) is probably too slow" [35,p. 150] He says the "...rational for
the[se]...numbers is that the lower bound indicates a "minimum" number of bids for 
the seller to be able to ensure a competitive return" [35,p. 150]. Earlier, it was 
noted that the expected return increases with the number of bidders, it should be 
mentioned here that this increase diminishes very fast, and three or four bidders 
should be considered as a minimum. Below that number no bids should be ac­
cepted on a particular tract. The upper limit, that is when the number of bidders is 
large, is suggested "as a first approximation at indicating a situation in which the 
rate of lease offerings is slower than the long-run demand..." [35,p. 150].
As was mentioned earlier, the demand for leases is a derived demand and 
grows of a desire by producers to maintain an portfolio of lease areas for future
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production. This demand depends on the expected rate of future exploration, and 
if the market is not in equilibrium, on the surplus or deficit inventories of explora­
tion tracts held by firms. These inventories of lease tracts vary with oil prices, in­
terest rates, lease prices, present and expected future input prices, which affect 
production rates and upon various technological and economic factors, which 
determine the rate at which lease areas can be brought into production. The op­
timum rate of leasing depends on the demand function that the lessor faces. 
Ramsey maintains that changes in the Federal governments lease offerings over 
the intermediate to long run would have "...little effect on demand price; that is, 
the lease market is competitive on the supply side" [35,p. 147]. If this is true at 
the Federal level, we can safely conclude that it is also true for Montana. Thus, a 
reduction in lease offerings will not substantially affect the expected market price 
for leases, and the complaint that fewer lease offerings will drive up the cost of 
exploration is clearly not valid and can be dismissed from further consideration 
(economic consideration at any rate) when planning the timing of the release of 
tracts for leasing.
3.8. An Optimal Lease Procedure
Throughout this discussion, I have mentioned the effects of different vari­
ables on the leasing process; as well as the informational requirements of both the 
lessor and the lessees. Without repeating that discussion, there are several 
recommendations for an "optimal" leasing policy.
The bidding firms have an interest in obtaining information about specific
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tracts to be leased, while Informational needs of the seller are minimal. It is In the 
lessor's best interest to see that the firms can acquire the information they con­
sider necessary. It is also In the sellers interest to see that this information is 
symmetrically available, that is, each bidder has equal access to the information 
that they feel they need. Note that this does not require that firms have the same 
amount or type of information only that there is non-discrimination in the access 
to information. This implies that tracts to be leased need to be announced with 
enough lead time to allow all (or most) firms the time to survey tracts before sub­
mitting a bid, and that the tracts should be offered at regular intervals so firms 
can make efficient inventory decisions.
The geographic dispersion of the tracts should be determined by the demand 
for them. However, the seller should try to make a lease offering as homogeneous 
as possible. This is to equate the "marginal exploration cost", i.e. the cost of ac­
quiring information about a particular lease, for all tracts being offered at one auc­
tion. This helps maintain the probability of any one tract receiving a bid the same 
as the probability of any other tract receiving a bid. By preventing bidders from 
allocating all their resources to tracts, which are clearly in prime areas; they are 
encouraged to gather information about, and bid on the unknown speculative 
areas. The quality of tracts can be varied from sale to sale as desired. The long 
term timing of the lease sales should be based on expected demand for lease 
tracts in the future and their expected price per acre. This can be modeled using 
the approach to be discussed in the statistical chapter.
If Ramsey's rule of not accepting bids on tracts with less than four bidders is
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followed, then the seller need not establish a minimum or reservation price. Those 
ares receiving less than four bids are merely offered again at sometime in the fu­
ture. Just because a tract received less than the minimum number of bidders 
does not suggest that it is less valuable than others that received more, perhaps 
only two bidders had what they considered adequate information to bid. A study 
done in 1969, has shown that re-issued tracts have same probability of receiving a 
given number of bids as first time tracts, and "...the amounts will be the same on 
average as ...equivalent tracts" [35,p. 155].
The bidding should be on a bonus amount with a given fixed royalty, but the 
royalty levels should be a negotiable item between the seller and all the bidders, 
before the bidding begins. This allows the bidders to determine their optimal 
trade-off between risk assumption and expected return. With the royalty payment 
fixed the lessor accepts a portion of the risk. A net-worth maximizing seller could 
set a royalty which maximizes the total discounted, expect return.
Chapter 4 
Statistical Analysis
4.1. Modeling Theory
Many models are chosen with regard to the underlying mechanisms of the 
system. However, when the system Is too complex, the analyst lacks understand­
ing of it, or the necessary data is unavailable, an "empirical" or statistical model is 
developed to approximate the data, rather than describe the underlying relation­
ships. Statistical models are used to approximate systems that are so complex 
that relevant information about the system can only be statistical in nature and 
typically the model is a distinct simplification of the system it is modelling. The 
task is complicated by the fact that the analysis is not aimed at constructing a 
complete theory of the system, and thus there can be a number of plausible 
models for any given economic phenomenon.
A statistical model is a model that expresses outputs in terms of 
probabilities. 'Thus, a statistical model Is used in those cases where the output 
cannot be expressed as a fixed function of the input variables [38,pg. 4], Tests are 
usually performed to assess whether the output from the model yields reasonable 
inferences.
Models of broad economic systems generally include a whole network of 
relationships, which approximate the interrelationships in the economic structure.
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The single equation model is appropriate when there is no interdependence among 
the the variables included in the model. "Because there are usually two more en­
dogenous variables in each relation, it is Impossible to specify which endogenous 
variable is the dependent one" [22,pg. 22]. In this study, the oil market in Montana 
is assumed to be determined by the national and international markets, and all of 
the variables are external (exogenous) to the model, which allows us to use the 
single equation type of model.
Another major consideration in formulating a model is its complexity. It can 
be argued that economic systems are themselves very complex and so the models 
used to describe them should also be very complex. In general, however, the goal 
of the model is to generate reasonable, accurate predictions without large amounts 
of data collection or computation time. Often this can be accomplished with a 
less complex (or more parsimonious) model.
A model of individual bids would include many variables, such as interest 
rates, oil prices, the bidder's wealth, tract location (and other geophysical 
information), exploration costs (which are site specific), availability of markets, 
number of bidders, etc. However, when modeling the market, a number of those 
variables are too specific, and others are unnecessary.
4.2. Analysis
Typically, the goal of a study such as this would be to develop a model 
predicting the future price per acre of lease tracts. However, since the bidders can 
change the acreage for sale by requesting that lands be put up for bidding, this
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creates a series specification problem and it is difficult to isolate the effects of 
changes in economic conditions on price alone, i.e. if the quantity supplied is 
determined by the buyers it is difficult to accurately estimate the demand response 
to changes in market conditions, and using some measure of average price would 
tend to underestimate the influence of the important economic variables.
In terms of the problem being examined in the paper, it is also unnecessary, 
because the implications to the state of changes in the petroleum market revolve 
around changes in total revenue from lease sales and not average per acre price. 
Figures 4-1 and 4 -2  show two examples of extremes in market response to 
changes in demand. In figure 4-1 any increase in demand is taken up by an in­
crease in quantity supplied. In this case there is no change in the price level. In 
figure 4-2, there is no change in the quantity supplied and any change must occur 
entirely in price. Contrast these with a more typical situation, in figure 4-3, in 
which there is both a price and a quantity response to changes in demand.
Given that both price and quantity change simultaneously, a composite vari­
able, TOTREV, the total revenue received by the state from the sale was analysed. 
Since this is the number that would be used in analystsing the impact of alter­
native leasing schemes, it is a reasonable choice. Figure 4 -4  and table 4-1 show 
the movement in leasing revenue over the period of study, 1971-1981.
By making this change in the predicted (dependent) variable, the accuracy of 
the model, i.e. the R̂ , was improved significantly. This seems to occur for two 
reasons. Fjfst, since both the price and quantity of land for lease can be varied in 
response to changing economic conditions in the oil and gas industry, it would be
f ig u r e  4 -1 :
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a good strategy for a bidder to spend the same amount of money for a larger tract 
of land, which serves to reduce the variability in price as mentioned above. 
Secondly, the minimum bid of $1.50 per acre acts as a floor on the price of many 
of the tracts. This also acts to reduce the variability in the lease price.
4.3. Methodology and Statistical Mode!
An attempt was made to use lagged variables to produce a model that could 
be used for prediction using current data. However, when using even a two 
quarter lag many of the variables that the theory suggests should be important 
were in fact insignificant and the fit of the model was so poor that this approach 
was abandoned. The best approach seems to be a model that uses concurrent in-
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TABLE 4-1;
YEAR QUARTER
BY QUARTER 
AVERAGE PRICE TOTAL REVENUE
1971 1 1.50 60459.8
1971 2 2.13 132272.9
1971 3 2.96 189232.8
1971 4 1.58 107361.6
1972 1 1.58 144868.5
1972 2 1.35 330337.9
1972 3 1.80 159914.0
1972 4 2.16 189844.6
1973 1 3.21 614498.5
1973 2 1.57 301139.6
1973 3 1.74 230372.4
1973 4 2.06 84057.6
1974 1 3.17 674527.9
1974 2 2.75 415876.6
1974 3 4.32 345238.2
1974 4 2.59 103456.0
1975 1 2.08 110434.6
1975 2 2.88 264897.6
1975 3 1.85 104200.0
1975 4 2.64 190544.3
1976 1 3.63 214257.1
1976 2 2.93 240646.4
1976 3 4.97 556279.7
1976 4 6.63 417151.9
1977 1 5.92 101024.3
1977 2 4.97 847796.8
1977 3 8.54 591244.3
1977 4 9.33 946409.3
1978 1 8.47 1462940.0
1978 2 5.55 1349452.0
1978 3 13.58 1373948.0
1978 4 7.82 714239.0
1979 1 5.13 751542.3
1979 2 14.53 1148718.0
1979 3 16.80 2158898.0
1979 4 16.48 4354938.0
1980 1 22.58 2714208.0
1980 2 35.70 15538688.0
1980 3 19.14 7519995.0
1980 4 13.88 3528867.0
1981 1 12.64 4676348.0
1981 2 16.93 1888446.0
1981 3 34.28 9857650.0
1981 4 15.45 682572.3
45
formation. That is, in order to predict TOTREV, the total revenue from a sale of 
oil and leases, at some point in the future, the user must pick likely values for the 
variables in the model. While this leaves the burden of choosing those values on 
the users of the model, it also makes for a much more internally accurate model, 
that more precisely pins down the relationships between total revenue and the 
other variables. There are a number of large econometric models that can be used 
to forecast economic variables such as interest rates, or oil prices and certainly no 
lack of predictions. These are all complex modeling problems and beyond the 
scope of this project. The final model which is discussed below, will allow the 
user to take certain projected economic variables or make some assumptions 
about the future level of those variables and see what the likely effects will be on 
the total revenue from the sale of lease tracts. It is this aspect of the model that 
will be the most useful from a planning point of view. The planner or policymaker 
can then project a likely path of total revenue over a given period of time with an 
eye toward maximizing the revenue to the state, i.e. the discounted value of the 
stream of revenues through time.
Two different analysis approaches were used to determine the best model. 
Ordinary least squares regression was used to derive a number of equations under 
different conditions and least absolute deviations regression was also used.
A technique call "bootstrapping" was used to account for the possibility non- 
random error terms in the regression and to check the coefficients for bias. The 
bootstrap measure is a nonparametric estimate of the accuracy of the statistic be­
ing estimated. The statistic b (any statistic) is calculated a large number of times.
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and the width of the interval that contains 68% of the distribution centered at the 
mean is the bootstrap measure of accuracy. Simply put the bootstrap is done by 
copying the data a large number of times, randomizing it and then samples of the 
same size as the original data set are repeatedly draw from the new data set. This 
is equivalent to drawing N observations from a sample of N, w ith replacement, 
and amounts to resampling the data space. These samples are called bootstrap 
samples. In this case, a regression is then run on these samples and the results 
are compared using a frequency distribution and a bootstrap statistic. Next the 
bootstrap form of the statistic in question is calculated, which is the mean of the 
statistics calculated from the each of the bootstrap sample sets. This allows us to 
estimate the bias of the numbers generated in the original regression. The fluc­
tuations in the estimated parameters from the regression of the bootstrap data 
sets show the variability of the statistical estimators for this set of data.
There are other means of estimating the the bias and variance of a statistic, 
among them are the jackknife and cross-validation. Efron [11], [12], [13], and 
[14] has shown that the bootstrap out performs both of these methods. The 
bootstrap is a very robust statistic, and it is not apt to be highly influenced by a 
few influential observations.
4.4. Data
The data on oil lease sales is collected quarterly by The Department of State 
Lands, and it includes information on the location of the tract sold, the county it is
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in, its size, the price per acre of the winning bid and the name of the buyer.® The 
data was collected by county with the intention that they would act as a 
geographic variable to help explain the quality of a tract, i.e. the likelihood that oil 
would be found there. While there are some counties that appear more likely to 
have oil than others, there was no relationship that could be statistically deter­
mined. Furthermore, no relationship seemed to exist between the amount of oil 
that was currently being pumped in a particular county and the total revenue ac­
counted for by that county in the lease auction. There may be two possible 
reasons for this; first, and probably most important, in the high production 
counties it is likely that most of the state land available for lease has already been 
leased and explored. Secondly, the known oil pools are not delineated by county 
lines. Thus, a pool could lie in a portion of the county and produce a large 
amount of oil, but tracts in another part of the county which are still available for 
lease are perceived has having a higher risk associated with them and thus would 
not be bid as high as others. This is a consequence of aggregating the leases into 
counties. If the tracts could be identified with a known pool or reservoir, perhaps 
this type of geographic variable could act as a proxy for the quality of the tract.
The variables included in the model are the price of oil, the interest rate, and 
a measure of U.S. oil production.
The marginal price of oil represents the average price for newly found oil in 
the continental United States, and does not represent the actual contract price that
^Appendix A shows the changes in oil leasing patterns across the state during the study period.
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drillers would receive when they brought that oil to market. Generally, this is not 
the most desirable way to proceed, however contract oil prices are often not 
available or in the case of a vertically integrated oil company would only represent 
a transfer (or accounting) price as the crude is transferred from the production 
division or subsidiary to the refining one. Here the best variable would be the ex­
pected price of oil over the lifetime of the project, but for a number of reasons 
there is no adequate way to include that kind of information, so actual wellhead 
prices are used. This data is from the U.S. Department of Energy and it predeces­
sors. Figure 4-5  shows the path of oil prices over time.
The next variable in the model is the interest rate, which by necessity is im­
precise. The interest rate used in the model, one year U.S. Treasury bonds, only 
approximates the interest rate that is available to drillers, but changes in that in­
terest rate are assumed to be approximated by changes in One Year Bonds. Ad­
ditionally, the interest rates available for oil field exploration are confidential, while 
the One Year Bond rate is readily available from the Federal Reserve.
Given the ease of transporting petroleum and its derived products, theory 
suggest that the Montana oil market would be influenced by changes in the U.S. oil 
market. The variable used in this study to model that influence, changes in U.S. oil 
production, is a proxy for market conditions across the country, and represents the 
increase or decrease in thousands of barrels of domestic oil production between 
time periods. Figure 4-6 shows the changes in U.S. oil production over the eleven 
year study period. The data is taken from The Oil and Gas Journal.
There are three highly influential observations in this data series. They occur
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at times The Organization Of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) announced 
large price hikes or production cut backs. This is appears to be due to the 
"announcement effect", i.e. decision makers responding to the changes before they 
actually occur. The impacts of these announcements were modeled using a 
dummy variable that was set to one when an a price hike or production cutback 
was announced and zero all other times.
4.5. Statistical Procedures
The presence of the extreme (or outlier) observations creates a problem 
when estimating the relationships between the independent variables mentioned 
above and the dependent variable, total revenue. Two somewhat different statis­
tical techniques were used to examine the influence of those three observations 
and derive a usable model; ordinary least squares regression and lease absolute 
deviations regression. Both of these methods were used on the full data set of 43 
observations and on a data set of 40 observations with the outliers deleted. Or­
dinary least squares regression was also run on the data set of 43 observations 
with the dummy variable for OPEC interventions. In addition, both techniques were 
used with principal components to examine the effect of the multicollinearity that 
exists in the data set.
Ordinary Least Squares regression (OLS) was used to estimate the initial 
equation. The OLS criteria is designed to find a line that minimizes the sum of the 
squared distances between the actual observations and the regression line. 
However, OLS is greatly influenced by outliers. The effect of an outlier is propor­
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tional to the square of its distance from the regression line. If these outliers are 
due to rare events, it is often difficult to accurately estimate their effect in the 
regression. There are several methods for dealing with this type of situation. 
Deleting those observations the researcher thinks are causing the problems is one 
approach, but this means that some potentially valuable information will be lost. 
"As a general rule, outliers should be rejected out of hand only if they can be 
traced to causes such as errors in recording..." [9,p. 153]. Another method is to 
use a technique that is less sensitive to outliers, such as Least ABSolute deviations 
regression (LABS). Where ordinary least squares seeks to minimize the sum of the 
squared distance between the predicted and the actual observation, least absolute 
deviations, as its name suggests, seeks to minimize the sum of the absolute dis­
tance between the predicted and the actual points. This is considered the loss 
function to be minimized, in the case of OLS, the sum of the squared deviations is 
minimized, and in LABS, the sum of the absolute deviations is minimized. Thus, in 
least absolute deviations, a point that is four units from the regression line is only 
exerting four times the influence of a point one unit from the regression line, while 
in ordinary least squares such a point would exert sixteen times the influence. In 
some "circumstances least squares may give undue weight to extreme 
observations" [16,p. 361]. The problem is one of selecting the loss function, L, to 
be minimized when estimating the vector of B's, where L depends on the M 
dimensional multivariate distribution and the estimated parameter vector B. "Since 
the estimator B is random, as it depends on the random vector Y, the loss incurred 
in not knowing the parameter vector will also be random" [24,p. 21]. Since the
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vector B is not known, the estimation of B is entirely dependent on the choice of 
decision rules, i.e. the choice of loss functions to be minimized. Table 4 -2  shows 
how an estimated coefficient, B, changes as the loss function is varied. The choice 
of OLS or LABS is determined by the researchers view of the loss function. If a 
quadratic loss function seems appropriate, then OLS is the desired technique. On 
the other hand, if a linear loss function seems more appropriate then LABS should 
be used.
Change in Coefficient Due to a Change in Technique
OLS W/40 OLS W/43 OLS W/43&D LABS W/40 LABS W/43 
Value 0.5597 0.7668 0.6653 0.6630 0.8197
Table 4-2: Coefficients Under Various Loss Functions
Principal components is a technique that is used if there is insufficient data 
to adequately develop a model, or if there is some degree of multicollinearity in 
the independent variables. The principal components are derived such that they 
are linear combinations of the variables, and contain all the variation of the original 
variables. They are also derived so they are orthogonal which removes the col- 
linearity problem in multiple regression. "The principal component, z.,, is seen to 
be a means of capturing the essence of both x., and without totally discarding 
either" [42,p. 425]. There is some concern with regard to the use of principal
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components in regression, because it is difficult to define them. They are artificial 
variables that are linear combinations of other variables, and thus not directly 
identifiable in economic terms. However, this does not prevent them from being 
used in predictive models. It just makes them hard to interpret
4.6. Results
The coefficients from the final analysis of each technique appear in table 4-3. 
InRev is the log transformation of the variable TOTREV (plotted in figure 4-7), 
InPRC is the log transformation of the price of oil in the U.S., InY R B l is the log of 
the interest rates on one year Treasury bonds, difPR is the change in the amount 
of oil produced in the U.S., and OPEC is a binomial variable (0,1) that is used to 
model the OPEC oil shocks in 1972 and 1979. These transformations are used to 
improve the fit of the data.
COEFFICIENTS 
TECHNIQUE 
OLS W/40 
OLS W/43 
OLS W/43&0 
LABS W/40 
LABS W/43
OPEC
1.6002
BASIC VARIABLE COEFFICIENTS 
LNPRC LNYRBl DIFPR CONSTANT
0.5597 1.8079 0.00161 8.2300
0.7668 1.5282 0.00170 8.3962
0.6653 1.5973 0.00171 8.3968
0.6630 1.2620 0.00102 9.1820
0.8197 0.9903 0.00097 9.3816
Table 4-3: Actual coefficients
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4.6.1. OLS Regression
The final OLS equation with diagnostic statistics appears in table 4-4. The 
coefficients in the regression equation measure the change in InREV associated 
with a unit change in the particular variable. For example, a one unit change in 
the logged price of oil results in a 0.6623 change in the logged total revenue, 
holding all others variables constant. Beneath the equation are the beta coef­
ficients. They are obtained by normalizing the original data for each variable by 
subtracting its mean and dividing by its estimated standard deviation, and then 
regressing this transformed data. The beta coefficients are useful when making 
comparisons of the relative Importance of the different independent variables in 
the regression model, which is not possible with the b coefficients, because the 
variables are measured in different units and have different variances [34,pg. 90]. 
The beta coefficient adjusts the unstandardized coefficients by the ratio of the 
standard deviation of the independent variable to the standard deviation of the de­
pendent. Examining the beta coefficients, we note that the variable for the price of 
oil, InPRC, and the variable for the cost of money, InYRBl, have the greatest im­
pact, and the variable for OPEC impacts has less impact and the variable for 
domestic production of crude, difPR has the least.
Table 4-5 and figures 4 -8  and 4-9  show the total of the deviations of the 
predicted from the actual observation for both squared deviations and absolute 
deviations criteria, using as a measure, all 43 observations or only the 40 non­
outlier observations. This total is one way to examine the accuracy of a particular 
model. The greater sum of the distances (either squared or absolute), the less ac-
TABLE 4-4;
The f in a l OLS equation (with OPEC variab le) Is :
InREV = 8.388 + .66231nPRC + 1.60581nYRBl + .00171d1fPR + 1.5980PEC
R SQUARE .75918
ADJUSTED R SQUARE .73383 DURBIN-UATSON 1.835
STANDARD ERROR .70394 F -  STATISTIC 29.984
VARIABLE B SE B 95% CONFONCE INTRVL B BETA SE BETA T SIG T
LNPRC .66233 .22755 .20167 1.12299 .38264 .13145 2.911 .0060
OPEC 1.59752 .42644 .73424 2.46079 .30180 .08056 3.746 .0006
LNYRBl 1.60577 .53912 .51439 2.69716 .38506 .12928 2.979 .0050
DIFPR 1.712107E-03 6.26075E-04 4.446845E-04 2.979529E-03 .22169 .08107 2.735 .0094
(CONSTANT) 8.38800 .73162 6.90691 9.86909 11.465 .0000
UI
TABLE 4-5:
D E V IA T IO N S  FROM ACTUAL OBSERVATIONS U SING  VARIO US E S T IM A TIO N  TECHNIQUES
USING  VARIABLES  
OLS W /4 0  OLS W /4 3  OLS W /43& D  LABS W /4 0
ALL 4 3  OBS 
SQUARED DEV. 2 6 .9 6
ABSOLUTE DEV. 2 7 . 2 8
W ITH  4 0  OBS 
SQUARED DEV.  1 8 . 2 5
ABSOLUTE DEV.  2 2 . 4 1
2 5 . 8 9
2 7 . 2 3
1 9 . 1 0
2 2 . 8 6
1 8 . 9 1
2 3 . 7 6
1 8 . 3 6
2 2 . 5 4
2 7 . 7 5
2 6 . 7 7
2 0 . 10 
2 2 . 2 3
LABS W / 4 3
2 7 . 6 6
2 6 . 5 6
2 0 . 9 8
2 2 . 2 5
USING  P R IN C IP A L  COMPONENTS 
OLS W / 4 0  OLS W / 4 3  LABS / 4 0  LABS W / 4 3
1 4 . 7 6
1 9 . 7 3
1 0 . 6 5
1 6 . 3 7
1 4 . 1 0
1 9 . 7 0
1 1 . 1 8
1 6 . 8 9
1 5 . 3 2
1 9 . 2 6
1 1 . 3 0  
1 5 . 8 9
1 5 . 0 0
1 9 . 2 1
1 1 . 3 8
1 6 . 0 3
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curate the model is. For example, the OLS variable model built on 43 observations 
with the dummy variable (OLS W /43&D) is more accurate than any of the other 
OLS or LABS models using all 43 observations as a criteria, but the LABS model 
built on 40 observations is more accurate using as a criteria of accuracy the total 
distance (absolute deviations) from the 40 non-outlier observations to the 
predicted observations.
4.6.2. OLS Diagnostics
The diagnostic statistics for the OLS equation are beneath it. They include 
measures of accuracy of the model, the proportion of total variation explained, ac­
curacy of the individual parameters, and others.
The R squared (Rf) is the proportion of the total variation of the dependent 
variable explained by the regression, and is another way of identifying the accuracy 
of a model. It varies between 0.00 and 1.00 with an of 0.00 occuring when the 
regression equation explains none of the variation in the dependent variable and 
an R  ̂ of 1.00 indicating that the equation perfectly estimates the dependent vari­
able. The R  ̂ value is sensitive to the number of parameters to be estimated be­
cause it does not account for the number of degrees of freedom in the analysis. 
With enough explanatory variables, it would be possible to fit every point in the 
data with the regression equation and thus obtain an R̂  of 1.00. We can account 
for this reduction in degrees of freedom by using the adjusted R .̂ The OLS R  ̂
was 0.7592 and the adjusted R  ̂ is 0.7338. It is this last figure which more ac­
curately states the percentage of variation that is explained by the above equation. 
Approximately 73 percent of the variation in the log transformed variable TO TREV
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is explained by this regression.
The T-statistics are used to test the significance of each coefficient. Those 
significance levels are next to the T values. The highest significance is less than 
.01, which means that we can reject the null hypothesis (with 99% confidence) that 
the parameter being estimated is equal to zero. This indicates that the relationship 
between the independent variable and the dependent, InREV, is statistically sig­
nificant.
The F statistic can be used to test the significance of the entire equation and 
is useful for joint tests of significance. The null hypothesis is that all the 
parameters are equal to zero. In this case the F value is so high that the null 
hypothesis can be rejected with almost 100 percent certainty.
One of the assumption of least squares regression specifies the statistical 
independence of the error terms, i.e. the disturbance term is not auto-correlated. 
In economic studies such as this one, which involve time-series data this assump­
tion is often violated. The consequence of this is that the variances of the es­
timates of the b's tend to be overstated, thus the calculation of the confidence in­
terval becomes less reliable. This autocorrelation (or serial correlation) in the data 
can lead to under estimation of the variance of the b's through two channels, it 
increases the true variance and decreases the estimate of the variance. This in­
creases the probability of a Type I error. A Type I error is that of rejecting the null 
hypothesis when it is actually true. In this case, the null hypothesis is that the b's 
are equal to zero. Another consequence of autocorrelation in ordinary least 
squares is that the predictions are not efficient, in that they will have a larger
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variance than other econometric techniques. The Durbin-Watson statistic is a 
measure of first-order serial correlation. The Durbin-Watson in the OLS equation 
is 1.83, which is above the critical value of 1.74 (6% level) so the null hypothesis, 
that first-order serial correlation exists, can be rejected at the 96% level [10,p. X].
One method of correcting for auto-correlation is the Cochrane-Orcutt itera­
tive technique, which in addition to estimating the parameters also estimates the 
value of rho, the first order serial correlation coefficient. When the Cochrane- 
Orcutt technique was applied to this data the beta coefficients did not change sig­
nificantly and rho was highly insignificant. This reinforces the conclusion of the 
Durbin-Watson statistic that serial correlation is not a problem in this data.
4.6.3. Least Absolute Deviations Regression
The LABS variables are the same as those used in the OLS equations, except 
that the OPEC variable has been excluded. Since it is hard (or impossible) to 
forecast that type of market intervention, it seems reasonable to exclude it from a 
forecasting model. It is interesting to note the strong influence the announcement 
effect has on the lease sale revenues. The LABS estimates are derived using a 
linear programming technique that minimizes the sum of the absolute distance be­
tween the actual observations and the predicted ones. The differences between 
the OLS and the LABS regressions are due to the influence of those highly influen­
tial points that occured as a result of an OPEC decision. The OLS estimates are 
strongly influenced by these observations, which shifts the equation and may bias 
the forecasts.
Figures 4 -8  and 4 -9  show the differences between the different methods
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used to estimate the equation, assuming either a quadratic loss function (OLS) or a 
linear one (LABS), for the entire data set of 43 observations and the restricted one 
excluding the 3 highly influential observations. It is interesting to note the dif­
ferences among the various methods. The OLS regression on 43 cases with the 
dummy variable clearly does a better job of explaining the variation in LNREV  
when measured across all 43 observations using either the squared deviations or 
absolute deviations criteria. However, since the purpose of this section is to de­
velop an equation for forecasting, and interventions such as those modeled by 
OPEC are hard to foresee, we shall drop the variable OPEC and consider the 
criteria to be "the best fit on the 40 observations that don't include those highly 
influential observations." It is apparent that the OLS regression on 40 observations 
is a better fit with a squared error loss function, and the LABS on 40 observations 
with a linear loss function. This is as one would expect since each of these 
methods is intended to minimize the sum of either squared or absolute deviations.
4.6.4. Multicollinearity
The absence of multicollinearity is one of the assumptions behind ordinary 
least squares regression. The effects of multicollinearity are inconclusive. While 
multicollinearity does not bias the estimates, the value of the coefficients may be­
come unstable and the standard errors are not accurate. This leads to the danger 
of mis-specification or excluding a variable because it appears to be insignificant 
due to its large standard error, when in fact the variable is an important com­
ponent in explain the changes in the dependent variable. "The reason why mul­
ticollinearity Is of such importance is that ...it is impossible to determine best
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linear unbiased estimators of the coefficients of the equation" [24,p. 14]. In this 
data there is a certain amount of coiiinearity present. The two variables InPRC  
and InYR B l appear to be linearly related. This can be detected with two methods. 
First the variance inflation factors (VIF) for the variables InPRC and InYRBl, which 
are indicators of multicoliinearity, are both high enough to indicate the presence of 
some kind of coilinearity. The ViF is derived from the diagonal of the inverse of 
the correiation matrix, in a perfectiy orthogonal matrix the VIF's are 1.00. In the 
data matrix used here, the VIF's were 2.72, 1.02, 2.63, and 1.03 for InPRC, OPEC, 
InYRBl, and difPR respectively. The values for InPRC and InYRBl suggest that 
there is some degree of muiticoiiinearity in the data. Another approach is to ex­
amine the squared muitipie correiations of the exogenous variabies. These are ef­
fectively the R-squared values when one of the variables is regressed on the 
others. For this data, they are 0.632, 0.023, 0.620, and 0.035 in the same order as 
above. The values for InPRC and InYRBl again suggest that some form of linear 
relationship exists in the data.
Multicollinearity is very often a problem in economic data, it makes it difficult 
to estimate the separate effects of the variables with any precision, in addition, 
variables that appear to be insignificant and are thus dropped from the analysis, 
may in fact have valuable explanatory power. While multicollinearity affects the 
individual coefficients, it does not affect the the predictive accuracy of the equa­
tion, as long as "the pattern of interrelationships among the explanatory variables 
is the same in the forecast period as in the sample period" [27,p. 453]. Muiticoi­
iinearity affects the variabies that are included in the regression equation. Those
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variables which are highly coiiinear will tend to displace each other in the regres­
sion equation. The theory suggests that there are a number of variables that may 
influence the decision of how many tracts to bid on and what to pay, but many of 
them are linearly related to others and this makes it difficult to include them in an 
equation.
One way around this problem is to develop principal components from the 
variables and then regress these on the dependent variable, total revenue. Prin­
cipal components are linear combinations of the variables and are derived in such 
a way as to "explain as much of the total variations in the data as possible with as 
few of the factors [principal components] as possible" [34,p. 389]. These principal 
components are orthogonal to each other, meaning they are perfectly uncorreiated.
When LNREV is regressed on these principal components, the percentage of 
the variation in LNREV that is explained is higher than when using just variables 
in the equation. Since principal components is a data reduction technique and 
may reduce the dimensionality of the data space, it is difficult to interpret the 
principal components. However, they can be usefully employed in prediction with 
the understanding that if the assumption of a constant relationship among the 
variables in the components is violated, the prediction will be in error.
Looking at table 4-5  again, we can see that the principal component regres­
sion is better at fitting the data than any of the models that use standard vari­
ables. Here again we have the choice of using linear error loss, or squared error 
loss, depending on how deviations from the estimated regression line are to 
penalized. The principal components OLS regression is noted in Table 4 -6  along
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TABLE 4-6:
The f in a l P rincipal components equation is :
InREV = 13.26 + 1.05PC1 + 0.439PC2 - 0.365PC3 - 0.311PC4
R SQUARE .81982
ADJUSTED R SQUARE .80085 DURBIN-WATSON 2.39006
STANDARD ERROR .60889 F - STATISTIC 43.22473
VARIABLE 6 SE B 95% CONFDNCE INTRVL B BETA SE BETA T SIG T
PCI 1.05050 .09395 .86030 1.24070 .76991 .06886 11.181 .0000
PC2 .43909 .09395 .24889 .62929 .32181 .06886 4.673 .0000
PC3 -.36527 .09395 -.55547 -.17507 .26771 .06886 -3.888 .0004
PC4 -.31061 .09395 -.50081 -.12041 -.22764 .06886 -3.306 .0021
(CONSTANT) 13.26335 .09286 13.07538 13.45133 142.839 .0000
Composition of Principal Components
VARIABLE PCI PC2 PC3 PC4
LRR 0.96326 0.08734 -0.11703 0.22497
LST -0.92419 0.08922 0.34784 0.12940
LNYRBl 0.79540 0.57002 0.17211 -0.04424
LNPP -0.69630 0.69091 -0.17896 -0.00601
LNPRC 0.97050 0.02680 0.17759 -0.06812
•Si
ro
73
with the composition of the principal components. The variables that compose the 
four factors (or components) are InRR, the logarithm of the number of active 
rotary drilling in the U.S., InST, the logarithm of Montana state oil production, 
InYRBl, the logarithm of one year Treasury bills, InPP, the logarithm of U.S. 
domestic oil production and InPRC, the logarithm of U.S. oil prices. These data 
series are shown if figures 4-10, 4-11, 4-12, 4-13, and 4-14.
The bar charts in figures 4-15 and 4-16, as explained before, show the dif­
ferences in the total residual for both absolute deviations and squared deviations 
measured across all 43 observations or the 40 that do not include the outliers. It 
is evident from these figures that there is not much difference between the LABS 
w/40 and the LABS w/43 models. Using a absolute deviations criteria, they are 
consistently better across both the 43 observation series and the 40 non-outlier 
observation series.
4.6.5. Bootstrap
Another of the important assumptions behind regression analysis is that the 
random fluctuations or errors are distributed about the true value in a normal or 
Gaussian distribution. This assumption is both necessary for regression and un- 
verifiable. Efron [12] has developed a technique, called the "bootstrap", used for 
verifying the results, that does not rely on assumptions of normality. The 
bootstrap is used to determine the statistical accuracy of parameters determined 
from the data. The bootstrap method "...requireEs] very little in the way of model­
ing, assumptions, or analysis, and can be applied in an automatic way to any 
situation, no matter how complicated" ll4,p. 36].
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For this study, the data set consisted of the 43 quarterly observations al­
ready discussed. The data set was used to form 5000 bootstrap samples that 
were then regressed. The coefficients on the dependent variables, the constant, 
the and the F value were then bootstrapped. Some sample bootstrap distribu­
tion plot are shown in figures 4-17, 4-18, 4-19, 4-20, 4-21, 4-22, 4-23 for illustra­
tive purposes. The bootstrap values and the bootstrap statistics for the variable 
regressions are shown in table 4 -7  and for the principal component regressions in 
table 4-8.
Note that many of the statistics bootstrapped are close to the numbers from 
the original regression. In particular, the coefficient on InPRC and the coefficient 
on InYRBl, and the constant were very close to those found in the regression. 
These distributions are shown on the graphs, and in most cases the regression 
coefficient is in the middle of the distribution,
4.7. Forecasting Model
Given the extreme values that occurred with the OPEC announcements, it 
seems inappropriate to use a quadratic loss function, since these extreme obser­
vations are very influential in OLS regressions. The goal of the model is to predict 
the best all around response in the total lease revenue to changes in market con­
ditions. Since, the "typical" situation does not include OPEC interventions, it does 
not seem valid to allow them to influence the model as strongly as they do in an 
OLS regression. Furthermore, the three influential observations are caused by a 
process (OPEC decision making) that is hard (or impossible) to model, so it seems
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Table 4 -7 : V a ria b le  Bootstrap C oefflcents
OPEC LNPRC LNYRBl DIFPR CONSTANT
BOOTSTRAP COEFFICENTS 
TECHNIQUE 
OLS W/40 0.5621
(.2 1 9 )
1.8010
(.5 8 2 )
0.00171
(.0006 )
8.2390
(.8 0 2 )
OLS W/43 - 0.7505
(.3 0 4 )
1.5622
(.7 0 3 )
0.00180
(.0007)
8 .3690
(.8 6 9 )
OLS W/43&D 1.6520
( .5 5 0 )
0.6340
(.1 9 9 )
1.5990
(.3 6 9 )
0.00181
(.0006)
8 .3670
(.7 7 3 )
LABS W/40 - 0.5466
(.3 9 9 )
1.7540
(.6 8 1 )
0.00158
(.0008)
8.3780
(.8 7 3 )
LABS W/43 - 0.6756
(.4 3 8 )
1.5700
(1 .1 6 )
0.00151
(.0009 )
8.5200
(1 .5 5 )
NOTEiThe number in  parenthesis is  the bootstrap measure.
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TABLE 4-8;
ACTUAL AND BOOTSTRAP COEFFICIENTS USING VARIOUS ESTIMATION TECHNIQUES
PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS COEFFICIENTS
PCI PC2 PC3 PC4 CONSTAN'
COEFFICIENTS
TECHNIQUE
OLS W/40 1.0230 0.4024 -0 .3118 -0 .2450 13.185
OLS W/43 1.0507 0.4394 -0 .3654 -0 .3113 13.263
LABS W/40 0.9625 0.3864 -0 .3820 -0 .3 0 32 13.130
LABS W/43 0.9791 0.4235 -0 .3405 -0 .3 6 02 13.150
BOOTSTRAP COEFFICENTS
TECHNIQUE
OLS W/40 1.0220 0.3996 -0 .3132 -0 .2 4 88 13.180
(.0 9 0 ) (.1 0 3 ) (.0 7 2 ) ( .1 2 4 ) (.0 8 4 )
OLS W/43 1.0490 0.4379 -0 .3665 -0 .3159 13.260
(.0 9 8 ) (.1 0 4 ) (.0 7 9 ) ( .1 3 4 ) ( .0 9 0 )
LABS W/40 0.9947 0.4041 -0 .3056 -0 .2640 13.160
(.1 2 4 ) ( .1 4 3 ) (.1 2 4 ) (.1 6 2 ) (.1 3 7 )
LABS W/43 1.023 0.4373 -0 .3260 -0 .3121 13.210
(.1 3 0 ) ( .1 5 3 ) (.1 2 6 ) (.1 8 6 ) (.1 4 3 )
NOTErThe number in  parenthesis  is  the bootstrap measure.
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useful to use a technique that is not highly influenced by those extreme obser­
vations, but still includes them for the potentially useful information that they con­
tain. Various alternative methods have been explored, and the results have been 
presented in both statistical as well as graphical form. The variable form of the 
equation includes variables that are coiiinear with other variables in the equation 
and other candidate variables, so a principal components approach was taken 
using both least squares and least absolute deviations loss functions. All regres­
sions where bootstrapped to examine the sampling effects and each of the 
methods showed varying degrees of bias.
Given all these considerations, it is the opinion of the writer that the prin­
cipal component LABS regression built on all 43 observations is the most useful 
for predictive purposes, i.e.
TOTAL REVENUE *  13.50 + 0.9791 PC i + 0.4235PC2 “ 0.3405PC -  0.3602PC4 
where the prinicipal components are composed of the variables, InRR, InST, 
InYRBl, InPP, and InPRC as discussed earlier.
Chapter 5 
The Future World Oil Market
In any long run analysis of the demand for petroleum and hence for drilling 
rights, it is important to consider what the condition of petroleum supplies will be 
in the future. The supply of petroleum is clearly related to its price. Conversely, 
the "market price of crude oil...has always been very sensitive to the laws of 
supply and demand" [20,p. 6]. As prices increase, there is a greater incentive to 
invest in exploration and development in order to increase production and thus 
profits, and if the supply is reduced for a given demand, the price will rise. The 
supply of oil is the sum of all oil from oil wells plus the supply of synthetic fuels 
from tar sands, coal liquefaction and shale. These latter sources require certain 
expensive production processes that are very energy intensive. As the price of 
energy rises, the cost of producing them also rises, therefore they are relevant 
only at prices high enough to pay the producer these higher costs and still 
generate a normal profit. There have been some subsidies paid for minor 
demonstration synthetic fuels plants, but all the major programs have been can­
celled, so there appears to be no real supply implications for the petroleum market 
from these sources in the next eight to ten years.
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5.1. Supply
In the event of large new discoveries in Alaska, the continental shelf or other 
places around the world, the price of petroleum might remain fairly constant or 
only decline slightly. Speculation about the crude oil reserve base is as risky as 
speculation about future consumption levels, and depends on assumptions of ac­
cessibility of reserves, future oil prices, discovery rates, efficiency of recovery, size 
of reserves and the technical details of production in less accessible areas. 
However, several recent studies allow us to make the following observations about 
the world supply of oil.
Taken as a group, the non-Communist industrialized countries will experience 
no significant increases in the production of oil. In fact, by the year 2000, produc­
tion in these countries may decrease by as much as 50%. It appears that 
"...geology is the primary limiting factor" (29,p. 35].
I will forego discussion of the developed countries, with the exception of the 
United States, since it is the largest single producer.
United States oil production in the future will probable arise from four prin­
cipal sources: (1) primary, and secondary recovery from existing proven reserves of 
26.5 billion barrels [29,p. 36], (2) natural gas liquids, (3) primary and secondary 
recovery from additions to existing reserves and (4) the use of enhanced or ter­
tiary recovery techniques. Primary and secondary recovery from existing reserves 
can be expected to decrease from 8.1 MBD in 1979 to 4.7 MBD in 1985 and 0.8 
MBD in the year 2000. This assumes that all U.S. oil fields produce at a rate of 1/8 
of known reserves [29,p. 37]. United States production in the year 2000 may range
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Table 5-1: Petroleum Production Forecast For OECO
PETROLEUM PRODUCTION FORECASTS FOR THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
1979 1985 2000
United S tates 10.2 7 .2 -8 .6 4-7
North sea 2.1 2 .8 -4 .0 1 .7 -3 .0
Canada 1.8 1 .6 -1 .8 1-2
o th e r Developed co u n trie s .8 .8_* .8_*
TOTAL 14.9 13-15.5 7.5-13
(may not add due to  rounding)
*  range o f p roduction  considered in s ig n if ic a n t  fo r  estim ates o f to ta l 
petroleum a v a i la b i l i t y .
Table 5-2: U.S. Petroleum Production Forecast
U.S. PETROLEUM PRODUCTION FORECASTS (MBD)
YEAR
1979 1985 1990 1995 2000
Primary and secondary 
recovery from e x is t in g
1979 reserves 8.1
Primary and secondary 
recovery from additons 
to  reserves
Natural gas L iqu ids  1.7
Production from 
enhanced recovery 
techniques
4.7 2.7 1.4
0 .8- 1.5 0 .8- 2.1 
1 .2 -1 .5  1 .1 -1 .4
0.8
0 .7 -2 .4  0 .7 -2 .5
1 .1 -1 .3  1 .0-1.25
0.4  0 .5 -0 .9  0 .7 -1 .4  1 .1 -2 .0  1 .5 -2 .5
TOTALS 10.2 7 .2 -8 .6  5 .3 -7 .6  4 .3 -7 .1  4 .0 -7 .0
(note:column may not sum to  to ta ls  due to  rounding)
Source: pages 35 & 26,
World Petroleum A v a i la b i l i t y ,  A Technical Memorandum 
Congressional O ff ic e  o f Technology Assessment, Washington
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between four and seven million barrels per day (MBD). The high estimate assumes 
the addition of one billion barrels to proven reserves and the greatly increased use 
of enhanced (tertiary) recovery techniques. This compares with the current U.S. 
production of about 10 MBD. Table 5-1 shows the projections of The Congres­
sional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) for the next twenty years within the 
Developed Countries, and Table 5-2, the breakdown of the U.S. numbers.
OPEC production is not expected to rise significantly over the next twenty 
years from its current level of 31 MBD. Since the end of the OPEC oil embargo in 
1973, total average annual OPEC oil production has remained fairly constant, 
changing less than 1 MBD from the 1979 average of 31.4 MBD. Exxon estimated 
OPEC liquid petroleum production at 33 MBD in 1990 and 2000 [15,p. 38]. OTA es­
timates a range of 28.5-35 MBD by 1985 and a range of 27-37 MBD in 2000 [29].
Any possibility of increased production within the OPEC nations will have to 
come from Iran, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and possibly Iraq. The 
first four countries have the known reserves to sustain more than marginal in­
creases in production. Iraq has the estimated potential to do so. This group will 
most likely continue to restrain production for political and social reasons rather 
than due to resource constraints.
While the Saudi's have the capacity to produce at levels of 12 MBD through 
2005 with existing reserves [6], they have announced that their intention is not to 
exceed 9.5 MBD even under conditions of higher levels of capacity [32]. OTA 
projects Saudi production to range between 8.5 MBD and 12.0 MBD by 2000 [29].
Iranian production over the last several years has flucuated greatly. In April
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1980, the production rate of Iranian crude was reported to be 2.7 MBO, by May of 
that year It had declined to a reported level of 1.1 MBD [31]. Both of these levels 
are below the pre-revolution level of 3 MBD. According to the CIA sustained 
levels of production above 4 MBD are "...unlikely without significant external 
assistance" [4].
Iraq Is the biggest question mark in OPEC. Forecasts for Iraqi production are 
subject to the twin considerations of political and geological uncertainty. Politi­
cally, the Iraqis have expressed opposing views on the future production levels 
they want to maintain. The CIA reports the Iraqi oil minister has expressed a 
desire to produce at 60 percent of capacity [3,p. 6]. In addition the Iraqi's are cur­
rently involved In a war with the Iranians, a side effect of which has been the 
destruction of a substantial part of the oil transportation infrastructure at the Shatt 
al Arab oil terminals. However the Iraqi government Is trying to assert some in­
fluence in the Third World. Petroleum Intelligence Weekly reports that as of April, 
1980 the Iraqi government has announced 15 long term low interest loans in com­
pensation for oil price hikes [30,p.15]. If this is true, the government will want to 
repair the damaged oil terminals and then increase production in order to use both 
the produced oil and the revenues from that increased production in order to 
maintain influence in the developing world.
From a geological point of view, there are a large number of undrllled struc­
tures in Iraqi territory. It is certain that at least a portion of these structures will 
yield oil in profitable quantities. In 1977, the CIA suggested possible production 
levels in the 5 to 6 MBD area where possible by the year 1986 [3]. In view of the
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currently war and the weakness In current world demand for petroleum products, 
these levels seem somewhat optimistic. Current plans call for an Increase in sus­
tained production to 4.5 MBD with some possible increase after 1985. OTA 
projects Iraqi production in the range of 2.7 to 4.5 MBD in 1985 and 3 to 5 MBD in 
2000.
Abu Dhabi, the largest producer in the United Arab Emirates, has plans to in­
crease production from 2 to about 3 MBD before the end of decade [28,p. 74]. At 
the present time government restrictions limit production in Abu Dhabi to 1.4 MBD. 
The other two emirates, Duban and Sharjah, currently lift about .4 MBD with no in­
crease in production likely. OTA estimates total UAE production will range be­
tween the current level of 1.9 MBD to 2.5 MBD if the government restrictions are 
lifted [29,p. 52].
Kuwait has consistently aimed its production at conserving resources. 
Production was level during the years 1974-1978 at 2 MBD despite an installed 
capacity which would have allowed them to greatly increase production. OTA es­
timates that crude oil production in Kuwait for the rest of the century will range 
between 1.5 and 2.0 MBD [29,p. 52]
The rest of the countries in OPEC (Algeria, Gabon, Libya, Qatar, Indonesia, 
Ecuador, Venezuela) are producing at close to the maximum possible rate. While 
there is a chance for marginal increases in production in some of the countries, 
these may well be offset by declines in the production rates of other countries. 
OTA projects levels of 9.5 to 10.5 MBD for these other OPEC countries [29,P. 53]. 
This compares with a 1979 production average of 10.5 MBD. With the exception of
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Libya, current reserves in these remaining OPEC countries are not large enough to 
maintain these levels of extraction through the year 2000. Thus OTA estimates a 
decline in production to the 8 to 10 MBD range by 2000.
There has been some discussion over what role OPEC will play in the future. 
This depends on their ability to maintain their cartel role in the face of increasing 
non-OPEC production and decline consumption in the OECD countries. Stephen 
Salent [37] has shown that when a production cartel does not have total control 
over available reserves of an exhaustible resource, the occurence of monopoly 
profits creates proportionally larger profits for those producers outside the cartel. 
This encourages greater production by the "competitive fringe", that group of 
producers outside the cartel who benefit by the actions of the cartel, but do not 
have to abide by its rules. In order to maintain price, ceteris paribus, the cartel 
has to cut back production. Being outside the cartel, the fringe producer has no 
incentive to cut back, rather the availability of reserves beyond the control of the 
cartel, coupled with the high rates of return available lead to more exploration and 
yet a larger supply. In these circumstances, the cartel is faced with either lower­
ing production in order to maintain price, thereby lowering their market share, or 
reducing their price in an attempt to maintain market share. On March 3, 1983 The 
Wali Street Journal reported that "U.S. imports of crude oil dropped to an 11-year 
low in the week ended Feb. 25..." [41,p. 15]. This was due in part to the recession 
in the United States, and in part to increasing conservations coupled with expand­
ing domestic production.
The higher price of oil also makes substitutes, i.e. alternative sources of
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energy; nuclear, coal, gas, solar, and conservation® more attractive. One Important 
difference between switching to domestic from imported oil and the replacement 
of oil by substitutes is that many substitutes once in place will not be abandoned 
without a substantial and perceptibly long term drop in the price of oil. This is 
largely due to the high fixed cost of switching fuels. In fact, the higher the per­
centage of fixed (i.e. capital) cost to variable (fuel) cost, the less likely will be a 
switch back to oil. In the case of increased efficiency (conservation), there will 
probably never be a switch back to greater energy consumption per unit output 
over the lifetime of the plant.
All major energy use projections, even those assuming low worldwide 
growth in economic activity and plausible assumptions of conservation, see a gap 
between projected supply and demand, unless there is a substantial addition of 
nuclear power, which does not seem to be on the horizon. This divergence be­
tween supply and demand, market disequilibrium, will put upward pressure on oil 
and gas prices. The timing and extent of the price changes will depend on world 
economic conditions, the effectiveness of conservation programs, government 
policies such as taxation and regulation, and any possibility of some kind of 
production cut-back or embargo. The effect of synthetic fuel subsidies is interest­
ing and somewhat unexpected. The U.S. Synfuels Corporation, the quasi­
government corporation that is subsidizing the building of synthetic fuels plants
®ln many studies conservation is considered in both the supply and demand for energy. Given that 
the use of more insulation, or a more efficient car, gets the same "work" done with less energy, thus 
freeing up supplies of energy for other uses, I will abide by that convention.
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energy; nuclear, coal, gas, solar, and conservation® more attractive. One important 
difference between switching to domestic from imported oil and the replacement 
of oil by substitutes is that many substitutes once in place will not be abandoned 
without a substantial and perceptibly long term drop in the price of oil. This is 
largely due to the high fixed cost of switching fuels. In fact, the higher the per­
centage of fixed (i.e. capital) cost to variable (fuel) cost, the less likely will be a 
switch back to oil. In the case of increased efficiency (conservation), there will 
probably never be a switch back to greater energy consumption per unit output 
over the lifetime of the plant.
All major energy use projections, even those assuming low worldwide 
growth in economic activity and plausible assumptions of conservation, see a gap 
between projected supply and demand, unless there Is a substantial addition of 
nuclear power, which does not seem to be on the horizon. This divergence be­
tween supply and demand, market disequilibrium, will put upward pressure on oil 
and gas prices. The timing and extent of the price changes will depend on world 
economic conditions, the effectiveness of conservation programs, government 
poiicies such as taxation and regulation, and any possibility of some kind of 
production cut-back or embargo. The effect of synthetic fuel subsidies is interest­
ing and somewhat unexpected. The U.S. Synfuels Corporation, the quasi­
government corporation that is subsidizing the building of synthetic fuels plants
®ln many studies conservation is considered in both the supply and demand for energy. Given that 
the use of more insulation, or a more efficient car, gets the same "work" done with less energy, thus 
freeing up supplies of energy for other uses, 1 will abide by that convention.
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may ultimately be contributing to the problem of a reduced supply and thus higher 
prices within the continental United States. Baumol and Wolff suggest that sub­
sidies to "innovative energy sources" have a "negative net yield of petroleum" [1,p. 
892]. The subsidies cause a net decrease in petroleum yield because the inputs 
that could have been used in oil production are instead used in the less efficient 
synthetic fuel project. If the subsidies do not lead to the substitution of energy 
inputs throughout the economy, then the price of oil must either be high enough 
to eventually pay for the cost of synthetic fuel oil or the subsidy must extend in­
definitely. If the subsidy is removed and the project is unable to compete suc­
cessfully and folds, there is a loss of liquid fuels to the market. This supply 
reduction must then lead to higher prices. Thus the subsidies will have the effect 
of both reducing the supply of petroleum in the long-run and eventually causing 
an increase in the price of all liquid fuels to the extent that synthetic coal products 
can be substituted for petroleum products and providing the subsidy is not main­
tained indefinitely.
OPEC is thus doubly threatened by competition and the loss of market share. 
First from other producers, which can be countered with price reductions or coer­
cion. Secondly from substitutes, which become more attractive at higher oil 
prices, which OPEC can not affect except perhaps in the very long run. It is worth 
noting that since a large percentage of the oil traded in the world market is used 
for transportation, with the exception of conservation the effect of substitute fuels 
in the world oil market will be fairly small.
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5.2. Demand
The demand for any energy input is a function of two main factors -  the 
price of energy and the level of income. As in the case of many products, price is 
the main determinant of demand, and with rare exceptions the quantity demanded 
varies inversely with the price.
The real price of oil declined from the end of World War II until 1967. This 
had two important effects. First, it accelerated the substitution of oil for coal, and 
secondly it speeded up the development of energy-intensive technologies and 
products while simultaneously retarded the development of energy-conserving 
ones. A study done in 1974 by Houthakker and Kennedy concludes that "if the 
[real] price of energy in 1970 had been at the 1948 level (i.e. about double the ac­
tual 1970 level), consumption in 1970 would have been 20 percent lower than it 
actually was".
The income effect causes the demand for energy to rise as real income rises 
[7,p. 34]. The current world-wide recession Is having a profound effect on the 
demand portion of the market. A reduction in GNP has a ripple effect through out 
the entire economy. Reduced demand, reduced production, reduced income, 
reduced consumption, all lead to a smaller demand for liquid fuels. Conservation 
and fuel switching make it unlikely that demand will return to the pre-recession 
levels for sometime. Some countries have instituted mandatory efficiency levels 
for automobiles, the EPA fleet average requirements in the United States are one 
example, or have gone to considerable lengths to obtain secure sources of liquids 
fuels for domestic use, Brazil's alcohol fuel program and South Africa's coal li-
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quification plants are two other examples. The argument that there exists an iron 
tight linkage between gross domestic product (GDP) and energy demand seems to 
have been discredited. During the period 1961-1973, a time when real oil prices 
were falling, the ratio of energy consumption to GDP rose every year in the in­
dustrialized nations. Since 1973 that ratio has been falling [36,p. 9]. A major por­
tion of that decline has been due to reductions in industrial energy consumption. 
While it is certain that the relationship between gross domestic product and 
energy consumption is positive, its strength is uncertain. Thus an increase in GDP 
will tend to cause an increase in energy demand, how much is a question that still 
remains to be answered.
5.3. Forecasts
In addition to the previous general discussion of future oil price patterns, 
there are several specific forecasts available. In "World Economic Outlook", the 
annual review of world economic developments prepared by the staff of the Inter­
national Monetary Fund, the oil market "is expected to remain weak in" 1986 and 
1987, leading to a projected price decline of "2 percent in 1985 and 3.5 percent in 
1986" [21,pg. 152]. After about 1990, the report suggest a "greater possibility of
an increase in the real price of oil" [21,pg. 155]
The U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration forecasts 
the price of oil yearly in "The Annual Energy Outlook". As the forecasts in table 
5-3 show DOÊ/EIA is calling for an increase from the current price of $28.00 in 
1984 to $40.00 (in 1984 dollars) by 1995 [8, pg. 219]. This is almost a 43 percent
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increase in the real price of oil. The last column shows the price of oil in nominal 
dollars assuming a 4% rate of inflation.
Table 5 -3 : Petroleum P rice  Forecasts
YEAR OIL PRICE (1984 DOLLARS) OIL PRICE
(DOLLARS PER BARREL) (DOLLARS
1984 28.00 28.00
1985 28.00 29.00
1986 27.00 29.00
1987 27.00 30.00
1988 28.00 32.00
1989 29.00 34.00
1990 30.00 37.00
1995 40.00 60.00
SourcetU S. Department of Energy, EIA, "The Annual Energy Outlook"
Note: nominal price calculated by author assuming a 4% rate of inflation.
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5.4. Discussion
The effect of these multiple demand and supply considerations is to make it 
difficult to accurately predict the price of oil. In the short run, it looks like the glut 
of oil on the market will continue for sometime, thus holding down prices. In the 
long run, it seems, the price of oil can only go up. Barring an almost unimaginably 
large discovery or a tremendous reduction in the demand for oil there seems no 
other conclusion that can reasonably be reached. The problem is one of deter­
mining the eventual magnitude of that increase and its timing. These are not 
topics I intend to pursue. There are a number of models developed by research 
groups across the United States that attempt to forecast the oil market with vary­
ing degrees of success. My purpose here is to present the world oil situation, and 
a discussion of the future with the implications for Montana resulting mostly from 
changes in world wide supply and thus on price.
Chapter 6
Perspectives, Policy Implications and Further Research
The primary question throughout this paper, is how the government (i.e. 
Montana) is to allocate non-renewable resources, using long range forecasting and 
planning with albeit imperfect alternatives as well as attempting to account for risk 
while still maximizing the present net value.
6.1. Perspectives
At the first level, there is a choice between centrally managed allocations 
and market allocations. Centrally managed allocations would not be acceptable to 
a large number of people and thus are not a politically acceptable alternative in 
this regard. There was some discussion of risk allocation and whether the 
government should be the ultimate risk bearer. The answer, on the basis of Pareto 
optimality criteria, and market allocations under risk, is that the government as ul­
timate risk bearer is inappropriate in this situation.
Chapter three introduced the concept of risk. It was mentioned that risk, the 
probability that things may not turn out as planned, maybe due to either inherent 
risk or to the decision maker's ignorance. In either of these instances, the 
decision-maker is faced with determining whether to live with the risk, to pay the 
cost of reducing it, or to compensate someone else for bearing all or a portion it.
1 0 0
101
It was also noted that risk is a real cost to decision making, and requires that real 
resources be included in the cost analysis of various policy actions. Thus, at a 
societal level, the more risk averse its people are, the more costly to society risky 
situations are. The net result is that whether or not government takes on risky 
projects, society through the individual bears the risk. The market solution allows 
the less risk adverse (i.e. risk takers) to specialize in risk taking.
It has been stated that in general with risk averse sellers and bidders, the 
optimal bidding arrangement is a bonus bid for auction with a prespecified but ne­
gotiable royalty. The use of surface rents may have some value in preventing the 
build up of inventories of un-drilled leases by raising the opportunity cost of hold­
ing an undrilled lease, but this will tend to distort investment by firms in those 
lease inventories unless the rent is kept to some "small" level. If large numbers of 
leases are being purchased and held as inventory, this suggests that the leasing 
rate is too rapid. Firms may perceive that it is in their best interest to purchase 
leases at a lower rate now, anticipating that the price will increase to the point 
that it pays to hold the leases as an investment. In most cases, the bonus pay­
ment will be large enough to encourage fairly rapid development, and coupled with 
the uncertainty in the price of oil, will reduce the necessity for large surface rents 
as a policy option.
Chapter four developed an empirically descriptive model that can be 
employed to predict revenue from the lease auctions in the future given a number 
of variables. This is a tool that can be used to plan the timing of revenue from 
those sales in such a fashion as to maximize the return to the state. The coef­
1 0 2
ficient on the OPEC intervention variable indicates that the market responses in a 
significant way to shocks, such as those produced by the oil embargo and sub­
sequent price hikes. While this type of market intervention is impossible to 
forecast, it must be kept in mind that any future shocks are likely to also affect the 
market in a similar fashion.
Chapter five discussed the future world oil situation with an eye toward the 
effect supply and demand changes will have on the market in Montana.
6.2. Policy Implications
One of the main advantages of using bidding as an allocative device is that it 
minimizes the amount of information the State (as seller) must have about a 
specific tract to be leased. There is a trade-off between risk and knowledge. If 
the rule of not accepting bids on tracts with less than four bidders is followed, as 
well as other suggestions made previously, the only information the state needs is 
economic information about the demand for lease tracts. Hopefully, this paper will 
make that type of analysis a little easier.
In general, the policy options presented throughout this discussion have 
been fairly straight forward. One can not, however make policy decisions on the 
basis of economic analysis alone. Some policy implications can be noted for firms 
and consumers, as well as the government.
Since the level of information that the bidders have is so important the 
government needs to insure that there is equal access to information by all inter­
ested parties. However, this is not to be construed as meaning that the State
103
should disseminate information or that it should require that firms doing explora— 
tion disseminate their information. On the contrary, since much of the information 
is gathered by firms that specialize only in gathering and interpreting that infor­
mation, these types of requirements would have adverse economic impacts on 
those very firms that are well qualified to gather such Information. Anyone can 
purchase that information from a firm that has done or will do the research and 
processing necessary without requiring the bidder to acquire the equipment and 
expertise to do the work himself.
Assuming these recommendations have been followed the "best" or optimal 
procedure is to use a sealed discriminatory bid procedure; that is, bids are sub­
mitted in sealed envelopes and the highest bid wins. This serves as a precaution 
against collusive behavior by the bidders, and prevents the free-rider problem 
among bidders. The amounts bid, but not the names of the unsuccessful bidders, 
should be published after each auction as this will provide information about the 
merits of various lease areas to other potential bidders. The requirement of sealed 
bids will prevent the use of signals between competitors during bidding, and in­
hibit collusion.
One of the striking results of this analysis Is that the government need not 
engage in gathering information about specific tracts. The only information that 
the government needs is of an economic nature, as has been developed in this 
paper. It is certainly easier and cheaper to develop economic data than to gather 
field data for all the tracts being offered at auction each year.
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6.3. Further Research
This study has pointed up several areas in which further research would be 
useful. The most significant is the whole question of lease timing. As it stands 
right now, the State of Montana has no way of controlling the timing of tract 
leases. It would be useful to examine how alternative timing schemes could have 
altered the discounted net revenue to the state. The model, developed in chapter 
five, could be employed to examine the effects of alternative lease tract timing. 
Another area of research that could be examined is the question of why some 
tracts sell and others don't. Using either discriminant analysis or logit/probit 
analysis, the researcher could attempt to predict whether a particular tract would 
sell or not, given certain conditions.
In conclusion, white no specific policy recommendations can be made, a 
number of suggestions and their rationale have been. It is hoped that the analysis 
and suggestions presented in this paper will help to clarify the process of oil and 
gas leasing and acquaint the reader with some of the issues and alternatives that 
should be considered when discussing the policy options available.
Appendix A 
Leasing Patterns
This appendix shows the changing lease patterns across the state during the 
lease period 1971 -  1981. There are three different approaches illustrated. The 
first in figure A-1 shows the acres of land being leased in each county as the 
vertical axis. The second, figure A-2, shows the price paid per acre in each 
county, and the third, figure A-3 the total revenue from the sale of the leases in 
that county.
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Figure A-1; Lease Acres
TOTAL ACREAGE LEASED -  1971
m
BY COUNTY
TOTAL ACREAGE LEASED -  1981
BY COUNTY
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Figure A-2: Price Per Acre 
average price per acre -  1971
average price per acre -
BY COUNTY
BY COUNTY
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Figure A-3: Total Lease Revenue 
TOTAL REVENUE FROM LEASE AUCTION -  1971
BY COUNTY
TOTAL REVENUE FROM LEASE AUCTION -  1981
BY COUNTY
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